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This study attempts to reconcile the concept of the na-
tional interest with the problem of foreign policy formulation,
using the Philippines as its central focus. The basic premise
is that foreign policy should be concerned with the "ability"
to achieve the national interest rather than with any strict
definition of the national interest itself.
The study finds that the national interest is actually an
undefinable set of needs and values, and suggests that policy
should be based on influence as the means whereby a nation
achieves this undefinable value system. It then analyzes
influence on a conceptual level and finds that three dimensions
(economic, military and political/ideological) determine a
nation's level of influence in the international system.
These dimensions are then examined to verify the need for
U.S. influence in Southeast Asia and to show how U.S ./Philippine
relations contribute to regional influence. The Philippine
domestic environment is examined to determine U.S. policy
objectives which will promote U.S. influence in the Philippines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study is inspired by a perplexing dichotomy in
American foreign policy. The dichotomy is perhaps rooted in
the fundamental pretext of democratic government and the con-
cept of the national interest. In the crucial paragraph the
founding fathers made the ultimate goal of American democracy
to secure for each individual the right to "life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness." Perhaps knowing that in a
pluralistic society each individual would have his own dreams
and aspirations, the authors of American government declined
to stipulate that the state would distribute to each indivi-
dual its version of life, liberty and happiness as it saw fit.
Rather, the state would insure that each American had the
ability to achieve his own interest as he came to see it.
As the population grows, as technology affects the
vicissitudes of moral consciousness, and as these changes are
reflected not only on the national level, but in the interna-
tional system as a whole, the American interpretation of life,
liberty, and happiness takes on new meaning. Nuclear
technology has changed the nature of international conflict
and national defense. Scarcity of resources and fear of
zero- sum phenomenon has had a tremendous impact on the nature
of global economics as well as the American concept of
abundance. Mass media, the "pill," and the welfare state have

all led to a situation where the individual is faced with
difficult decisions pertaining not only to the role of
government but indeed to what he is as an individual and what
his role is in society.
Nonetheless, scholars continue to define the concept of
the national interest as though it were an entity that the
state had an obligation to provide. Having accurately defined
what it is that Americans dreams and aspirations consist of,
the state could then set out to procure, promote, and protect
these in the national and international system. Thus , it
would appear logical to posit that there is either a moral
obligation or a scholarly justification for formulation of
foreign policy which is firmly based on an operational defi-
nition of the concept of the national interest.
This study in no way suggests that foreign policy should
not be based on American national interests. However, the
point of divergence is so rudimentary that what emerges is
an inquisitory process which differs greatly from the more
conventional approaches. The dichotomy was perhaps "stumbled"
upon when in an attempt to define the U.S. national interest
in the Repulbic of the Philippines it was discovered that no
consensus exists in American intelligentsia of what "national
interest" means much less of the American national interest
or an operational definition which will facilitate the process
of foreign policy formulation.
This study will, therefore, examine the concept of the
national interest. Is it subject to operational definition?
8

If so, would that definition be an accurate measure of all the
cross -cutting interests of this pluralistic society? Can a
formula be found such that by assigning different weights to
the intersts of various influential groups it can provide
for egalitarian representation of these cross-cutting inter-
ests? Is there any guarantee that as these interests conflict
with or complement each other, the formula would still be valid?
The first hypothesis attempts to explain this perplexing
dichotomy. If the concept of the national interest is so
diverse, so nebulous, and so elusive as to defy scholarly
attempts to operationalize its definition, how then can the
decision maker know for certain that the foreign policy he
will choose will accurately represent the dreams and aspira-
tions of his society? The basic premise here will be that
the decision maker need not be overconcerned with interpreting
this concept of the national interest since no single, ultimate,
independent interest can be found that can be said to be the
undisputable , overriding goal of each and every American.
Instead it will be argued that all interests are actually
instrumental goals , and that the only common denominator in
the set of needs, values, beliefs, and cognitive structures
is the ability to achieve whatever it is that the individual
or the nation as a whole desire.
However, having argued that the basis for foreign policy
formulation is to be found in the ability to achieve interests.

the study must then provide the vehicle through which the
decision maker transitions from the dreams of his nation to
providing the means of procuring, promoting, and protecting
these dreams. The international system provides no such
guarantees. Each nation is committed to promoting its own
interests by persuading other international actors to behave
in a fashion that is compatible with the needs of others
.
The second hypothesis, therefore, argues that a nation is
able to achieve its interests only when it has the necessary
level of influence to persuade others.
"Influence" is, therefore, examined to posit that, through
effective use of economic, military, and political/ideological
strength a nation can control the environment such that other
international actors will realize a greater net gain or lower
net cost by behaving in a manner which contributes to rather
than detracts from the interests of others. As a corollary
to this second hypothesis, the ingredients which contribute
to U.S. influence in the international system will be examined.
It would appear that while there is some divergence in the
literature as to what the concepts of power, influence, or
authority entail there is relative concensus among scholars
as to the elements which provide a nation with certain
leverage over the actions of others. Finally, these ingre-
dients will be analyzed in the global context to determine,
specifically, how they contribute to American global influence
10

The above discussion will comprise Part One of this study.
It will attempt to propose a model which will act as the vehicle
through which the decision maker can transition from the con-
cept of American needs and values to the formulation of foreign
policy. Part Two will then attempt to apply that model to the
formulation of American foreign policy with respect to the
Philippines
.
Chapter Four will examine two distinct hypotheses. While
the model offered in Part One suggests that the U.S. needs to
be concerned with influence as it looks toward the Philippines,
the first step must be to determine whether or not influence
in the Philippine context is crucial or irrelevant to U.S.
global influence. This chapter will begin with the premise
that U.S. influence in Southeast Asia is indeed crucial to
U.S. global influence. The second premise is that the U.S.
relationship with the Philippines contributes significantly,
indeed vitally, to U.S. influence in the Southeast Asia region.
Having argued that there are certain elements of the U.S./
Philippine relation which are indispensable to U.S. influence
on a regional level, and that regional influence is indeed
crucial to American leverage in the global context, the
decision maker must then examine how these indispensable ele-
ments can be maintained. Chapter Five will examine the
Philippine domestic environment to determine how its evolution
can be made to perpetuate a relationship which will contribute
to U.S. influence in Southeast Asia.
11

U.S. foreign policy in the Philippines must be prepared
to cope with the islands' economic uncertainty, political
transition, and the military environment. In all three
dimensions there exist opportunities for the effective imple-
mentation of optimum policies, and there are also many pitfalls
which should be avoided. The aim will be to analyze each of
these dimensions so as to determine , from among the
various alternatives available, the U.S. policy objectives
which will best contribute to the overall goal- that of
perpetuating a relationship which enhances U.S. regional
influence
.
Thus, this study is actually an attempt to provide the
policy maker with a different way of approaching the problem
of reconciling the concept of the national interest with the
formulation of foreign policy. To the extent that it succeeds
in this endeavor the model can then be applied to policy
formulation for any area or nation in the international system.
12

II. THE NATIONAL INTEREST
If U.S. foreign policy is to be based on the national
interest it becomes immediately apparent that some clear,
theoretical definition of the concept of the national interest
is absolutely essential. Moreover, if U.S. foreign policy
with respect to a particular nation is to be based on the
American national interests in that nation, then a system for
operationalizing the theoretical definition in terms of that
nation is likewise essential.
The key issue demanding immediate clarification before
the policy maker can set out to delineate foreign policy goals
and objectives would appear to be a definition of the concept
of the national interest. No such clear definition has as yet
been posited by scholars much more enlightened in the techniques
of theoretical abstraction than the average government official.
If the concept is of such a vague nature that the academician
cannot come to terms with the national interest, how then will
it be possible to arrive at a national consensus which includes
the interests of those unlightened masses who, in our pluralis-
tic democracy, have as much right to an opinion as to the
national interest as the chief executive himself?
It is readily apparent from a survey of the literature
that the scholar's dilemma is one of definition since most
authoritative works on the national interest have failed to
13

provide any conclusive or even constructive definitions of
the concept. In some cases scholars have made gallant efforts
at defining the concept but have nonetheless left many ques-
tions unanswered. Others have attempted merely to provide
some clues and to suggest possible approaches which might
help in eventually finding such a definition. Finally,
others have been primarily concerned with presenting a cri-
tique of what their colleagues have done or failed to do.
A philosophical quest for such a definition repeatedly
comes up empty handed and it is found that such a definition
may neither be possible nor necessary for this study. Indeed,
this study is concerned not with interests but rather with
goals, policies, objectives and strategies. It is this
distinction that will be made clear in the present section.
That is, there exists no such precise concept as a national
interest toward or in another entity, and moreover, the
problem of defining the national interest has reached such
tremendous proportions because definitions are usually
offered in terms exogenous to the concept itself.
However, though a definition may not be available, a
working concept remains necessary, until some other vehicle
can be found which can form the basis for foreign policy.
This will, therefore, form the second part of this first
hypothesis. If the national interest cannot be defined, the
vehicle through which the decision maker can move from the
concept of the national interest to the formulation of
14

foreign policy is the "ability" to achieve whatever that
interest turns out to be.
A. A TOPOLOGICAL SPACE OF INTEREST
That definitions are usually offered in terms exogenous
to the concept can be clarified by visualizing the national
interest as a topological space. This topology consists of
those values, beliefs, needs and cognitive structures which
are inherent to the people within the nation. The combinations
and permutations of these sets of values, needs, and beliefs
are, by definition, also within the topological space. How-
ever, using this perspective, any choice which would result
in action is assumed to exist outside the topological space.
This "choice" or "action" is in essence an attempt to achieve
those things which exist within the topology; but the "choice"
or the "action" itself is not within the sets of interests in
the topology. These are, therefore, not "interests" but
rather "instruments" or as VanDyke might describe them "instru-
mental goals."
The moment any attempt is made to define the national
interest in terms of something the nation or the individual
wishes to do or some action he may wish to take, the defini-
tion is outside the space of interests and is actually
describing actions in pursuit of an interest. At this point
the definition is speaking of goals, objectives, and strategies




The topological space can be clarified by looking at those
factors which exist outside the space in terms of VanDyke's
hierarchy of "dependent and independent interests." VanDyke
has argued that there can be no independent interest, that
is, an interest accepted as an end itself- independent of
any other interest. Therefore, the scholar or the decision
maker need not be overly concerned with defining that ultimate
goal- that final link in an unbroken chain where each interest
is a means to achieve some other interest. That ultimate
goal would be considered the independent interest, but un-
fortunately there is no formula whereby all can agree on the
definition of that final link. Thus, what the scholar or
the decision maker should do is break into the chain of
dependent interests at any appropriate point and analyze the
effectiveness of that dependent interest in terms of its
2
ability to achieve the next goal in the hierarchy.
There can be no formula to define that ultimate end
because VanDyke is concerned with goals not interests. Goals
involve actions. Actions can entail a continuing process and
an endless chain of new actions, and reactions. Once an
interest is operationalized, that is, once an action is set
in motion to achieve a certain interest, the action itself
does not become the interest. The interest remains within
the topological space and the action is the goal which will
achieve that entity. Thus, the interest remains an entity





Contrary to Casinelli's argument the body (whether an
individual, a group, or a nation) does posses the interest.
Casinelli may be accurate in that goals may not be possessed,
that is, the people do not possess the "actions" which are
designed to achieve the interests; but nonetheless, the
interests themselves are possessed and consist of Neihbur's
4
unattainable but always sought after values
.
The aim is not to provide conclusive evidence that the
topology of interests cannot someday be defined. It may
indeed be possible that at some point a model will be developed
wherein the combinations and permutations of all these values,
needs, beliefs, and cognitive structures can be calculated to
derive a definitive statement of what the national interest
actually is. However, as long as scholars continue to describe
these values in terms of actions designed to achieve them, it
is highly unlikely that such a definition can be accepted as
descriptive of that ultimate independent interest.
B. ABILITY TO ACHIEVE THE INTEREST TOPOLOGY
The above discussion indicates why such articulate scholars
as Harold Lasswell are accused of preoccupation with procedure
rather than content. Lasswell is preoccupied with the methods
to implement and enforce public interest instead of with its
content. In "The Changing Context of the Public Interest,"
Friedman argues that Lasswell 's definition would dissolve the




But, Lasswell's overinvolvement with the procedure rather
than the content of the public interest does not necessarily
hinder progress toward the formulation of foreign policy.
Indeed, if the national interest has not yet been defined,
this does not necessarily alleviate the need for establishing
goals. The "struggle for supremacy" which Friedman speaks of
tends to indicate that the element which actually remains
constant throughout any discussion of what the national
interest is or is not, is the ability to achieve those interests
in the international or subnational arena.
Therefore, Lasswell's preoccupation with procedure, though
it may not conclusively define the concept of the public
interest, does serve a useful purpose. The policy maker can
likewise be concerned with procedure, though not necessarily
for promoting and protecting a strictly defined model of the
national interest, rather with the procedure whereby one
acquires the "ability" to promote and protect whatever that
definition turns out to be. In other words, the decision
maker is concerned not so much with defining that interest
but with winning the struggle.
What is the difference? The difference can be found in
trying to avoid the pitfalls described by Minor in "Public
Interest and the Ultimate Commitment." Minor argues that the
public interest is often based on what has happened or what
is happening without regard to analysis of causal relation-
ships. He argues that too often these principles are cherished
18

as ends in themselves. There is clear evidence that Minor
is correct and that the United States continues to shape
policy in terms of interests which are not interests at all
but rather instruments. In a study by Maynes , Yankelovich,
and Cohen eight principles were found to be most prevalent
in defining the national interest. They are:
1. a strong defense posture
2. commitment to core allies
3. pursuit of detente
4. good relationships with the PRC
5. commitment to Israel
6. American leadership in world affairs
7. involvement in international foreign policy solutions
8. coherent energy policies.
By referring back to VanDyke ' s thesis it becomes imme-
diately apparent that these are not independent interests.
They are instead, instrumental goals, or the means to achieve
something else such as security, economic prosperity, or
prestige. One can continue up or down this chain endlessly
questioning the validity of any interest as an independent,
ultimate end in and of itself. Even a fundamental pretext
such as human dignity can be questioned for validity as an
absolute standard. In "Common and Public Interests Defined:
Comments on Harold Lasswell's Paper," Nakhnikian questions
Lasswell's premise of human dignity as a relevant assumption
o
for any society. This, however, implies that the assumption
19

need not necessarily be valid for another societal structure.
Thus, one is left with the dilemma of making valid assumptions
about the values of this other society and the question of the
national interest has remained unanswered.
But, does this dilemma detract from the effectiveness of
using instrumental goals as the basis for foreign policy? It
should not, particularly if the national interest can be given
a loose interim definition until such time that a better
alternative is found. The loose definition would stem from
9
an alteration of Musgrave's aggregate utility dictum. There
need be no question as to whether the public interest has a
moral or material foundation. The concept of aggregate
utility can be applied to ideology as well as to private
physical utility. For example, the decision maker should be
able to analyze a particular situation and answer, in his own
mind, what the cost will be in order to pursue a certain
policy. Whether the national interest has a moral foundation
or otherwise, the choice which maximizes the nation's ability
to achieve maximum aggregate utility along both material and
ideological variables will have to be adopted.
In a way, this view agrees with Pennock's concept in
"The One and the Many: A Note on the Concept." There is
nothing wrong with allowing the decision maker to apply his
judgement when it comes to interpretation of the public
interest. It is only when ideology, under the banner of the
national interest, enters into the process of goal and strategy
20

formulation that the issue tends to become confused. This
process should entail a cost/benefit analysis realizing that
values have a cost as well which is at times too high to pay.
"A legislature that delegates to an administrative
agency the power to regulate in accordance with the
public interest is not merely passing the buck, it
is providing the means for applying a dynamic and
increasingly precise policy based on experience
continuing contact with special interests, and
freedom to pursue the general welfare as they come
to see it." 10 .
If propping up an unpopular dictatorship implies a cost
by way of relinquished principles, the cost must be analyzed
in terms of the alternative. Not propping up the dictatorship
may mean the loss of strategic forward military positions
which will in the long run result in reduced security. If
that were the case the national interest would continue to
have a moral fiber, but the more costly of the two goals would
have to be deferred until some point in the future. The key
difference in this case is that the policy is based not
necessarily on the direct interpretation of the national
interest (i.e. global democracy) but rather on the nation's
ability to achieve that interest, perhaps at some other point
in the future. The example of the unpopular dictatorship is
a perfect analogy since there are numerous examples in the
international system where estrangement from strategically
vital countries would result directly in a diminished capacity
to achieve any interests whatsoever.
What is implied here is that the topology which has been
superimposed on the national interest consists of, as has been
21

stated earlier, Neibuhr's unattainable but always strived
for objective. Inside the topology there exist groups o£
values, beliefs, and needs universally cherished. However,
in the attempt to operationalize these into goals, objectives,
policies, and strategies the underlying element is the ability
to maximize aggregate utility in terms of these cognitive
structures, not the structures themselves.
There need be no dichotomy in this perspective of the
national interest. While it disagrees with Seabury in claim-
12ing that there is a moral purpose behind foreign policy
,
the moral purpose lies far back. It exists within the na-
tional interest topology, but is removed totally from policy
formulation since policy is to be based on the goal and the
objective of maximizing the nation's capability to pursue
the interest topology.
To help clarify this concept an analogy to Soviet policy
making serves a useful purpose. In that system the national
interest poses little problem and policy formulation is
generally clear and unhampered by debate over the moral pur-
pose. Clearly, whatever contributes to the power of the
Politburo is necessarily good for Mother Russia.
Our policy formulation process could be as clear and
unhampered as that of the Soviet Union if we pursue our
ideology just as they do, with a calculated analysis of the
cost/benefit factor in terms of capabilities. This approach,
however, requires clear articulation of the cost/benefit
22

calculus to the American people. In the Vietnam tragedy, we
failed, and to date continue to fail, to make clear the costs.
Thus, a small minority of outspoken opponents were able to
determine the shape of American foreign policy in the long
haul. We neglected to analyze the costs of losing the war,
the costs of decline in detente, the costs of Third World
castigation, and a host of other variables in terms of their
impact on our overall capability in the future. The result
was an ouster which will soon, if not already, prove costly
to our position in the Southeast Asia region and in the
international balance of influence.
It is not the intent, nor is it within the scope of this
study, to suggest whether or not our policy in Vietnam was
right or wrong. However, had we looked at the nature of the
situation in the terms proposed here, it may have been easier
to recognize that our international capabilities would have
been enhanced more by dialogue with the North after the French
defeat, than by a resumption of hostility in the name of
"containment .
"
Clearly the Russians minimize their susceptibility to
such blunders. Although their cost/benefit calculus is at
times faulty, it is clear that their actions are based on a
strict analysis of possible gains and losses with respect to
their overall position of power. Their recent invasion of
Afghanistan indicates that Soviet decision makers had taken
most factors into account. They have no qualms about suffering
23

a loss in detente, U.N. abhorrence, or even Third World
estrangement. For them, the cost was worth the risk and the
expense in order to consolidate their power base in that .
13
nation.
Note that this does not imply that Soviet decision making
has no ideological foundation, indeed it does, but it is
inherent to them and we cannot know whether it involves peace-
ful coexistence or world hegemony. What we see is only the
action taken in pursuit of an interest. Their ideology, just
as ours, is within the topological space, the primary differ-
ence is that they recognize the distinction between those
interests and their capability to achieve them. They allow
their actions and their positions to shift with the winds of
contemporary power balances. Their decisions are based on
those elements of international influence which their cost/
benefit calculus indicates are worthwhile at any given point.
Thus, the position offered here is one similar to
Morgenthau's concept of bargaining from a position of power.
Although the concept of power in the international arena
warrants closer scrutiny and will be addressed in the
forthcoming section, the short introduction above helps to
clarify the view of the national interest offered herein.
It is not suggested that power is indeed the essence of the
national interest. However, partly because the national
interest has not yet been defined, the observation is made
24

that regardless of how it is eventually defined the ability
to achieve it will continue to be the common denominator.
C. SUMMARY
In essence, the decision maker need not be concerned with
the national interest mystique for that will merely confuse
the real issue-policies to achieve the national interests.
The national interest is not something which cannot be pos-
sessed, as Casinelli would argue, but rather it is something
which is indeed possessed and represents Niebuhr's unattain-
able standard. The view taken is similar to VanDyke's hier-
archy where every action represents a means to achieve some
other end. In determining which end is worthy of pursuit,
the decision maker must adhere to Musgrave's aggregate utility
dictum. If the summation represents a net benefit, whether
the benefit be ideological or material, that course must
necessarily be followed. However, note that the benefit is
not couched in terms of the interests which exists within the
topological space defined, but rather it is in terms of the
extent to which that particular policy improves or detracts
from our "ability" to achieve other ends.
The final judge, then, is the decision maker. In adhering
to Pennock's thesis of "precise policy based on experience,
continuing contact with special interests, and freedom to pur-
14
sue the national interest as they come to see it," the de-
cision maker's actual goal is to provide for the nation the
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If the ability to achieve those values which comprise
the topological space of interests is to be the vehicle
through which the policy maker transitions from national
interests to foreign policy, then a clear understanding of
the means through which desired results are achieved in the
international system now becomes the focal point.
Within the space of interests there can be said to exist
a wide variety of values that may be attained without having
the ability to "move" an outside actor. In these cases, the
ability to achieve that value rests solely on the actor
himself, independent of external forces. A man's choice of
religious preference is such an example. Here the costs and
benefits of one choice (i.e. debauchery with damnation vs.
righteousness with salvation) are weighed against the costs
and benefits of another (i.e. disavowing the existence of
any life hereafter). The individual's ability to choose one
or the other may have already been predetermined (i.e. he was
raised under Christian theological presuppositions), but at
the time of his choice he need not exert any influence on an
outside actor.
A nation's choice as to the adoption of an Equal Rights
Amendment or Affirmative Action legislation provides the
same perspective on a national level . Although considerable
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influence may be exerted by subnational actors, the nation's
choice involves no interaction with the international community
While the basic premises of influence to be posited here do
have applicability to the internal power struggles over issues
such as ERA, the analogy is drawn only to distinguish between
choices that involve interaction with external forces. Where
the choice is totally "internal," such as the individual's
religious preference or the nation's cons titutional amend-
ments
,
the "ability" to make that choice requires no influence
relationships between an initiator and an external recipient.
These cases will, therefore, be dismissed for the purpose of
this study.
However, those sets of interests within the topological
space which require certain actions that impinge on external
forces do^ connote a certain influence relationship between
those forces. Where a choice requires another party to act,
or where a choice stimulates concomitant choice or action
by the other party, the goal of the initiator is to ensure
that the final outcome results in a net gain, at least for
the initiator. In actuality, the recipient of the influence
relationship will act only in a fashion that represents a
net gain for him. Thus, the goal of the initiator is to
present the recipient with a choice which provides him a net
gain as well.
Armed conflict is just such an influence relationship.
When a nation chooses to go to war it is because the rewards
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minus the costs of going to war are greater than the rewards
minus the costs of peace. Thus, for example, if the people
of Poland persist in their demands for liberalizing their
political structure, knowing full well that this will bring
on Soviet military intervention, it is because the reward
(freedom) minus the cost (lives) of that choice outweigh the
reward (peace) minus the cost (slavery) of the alternative.
It is within this context that this study will address
the nature of a nation's ability to achieve those things it
values most. When a nation's ability to achieve desired ends
requires or stimulates interaction with external forces the
goal of the initiator is to control that relationship in such
a fashion as to produce maximum benefit at minimum cost.
This control is the essence of power and connotes much more
than the elements of force or even of subtle persuasion. It
is the combination and the application of the ingredients in
the relationship between actors which results in the ability
of one actor to control the outcome.
In order to facilitate clarification and defense of such
a hypothesis it is necessary first to analyze the influence
relationship on a conceptual level; and second, to analyze
the ingredients in the relationship to determine how they
contribute to the influence of one party or the other.
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A. INFLUENCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
There is, at present, no international organization which
is capable of administering some semblance of order as nations
proceed in quest of their individual interests. This leads
to an environment wherein each nation must insure its own
ability to achieve its interests by influencing international
actors so that they will behave in a fashion which helps to
promote and to protect the interests of the nation in question
"The international community has never, in fact,
guaranteed the member states either life, liberty,
or the pursuit of happiness, whatever the paper
provisions of international conventions may have
stipulated. Each individual state has continued
to depend for its very existence, as much as for
the enjoyment of its rights and the protection of
its interests, primarily on its own strength or
that of its protector." ^
However, if a nation can depend solely on strength in its
quest for individual interest, by what means does it acquire
this strength? It is generally argued that power provides
the means whereby a nation secures its individual interests.
Morgenthau, for one, advocates bargaining from a position of
power, but as far back as World War II Nicholas Spykman
argued along similar lines.
"The statesman who conducts foreign policy can
concern himself with values of justice, fairness,
and tolerance only to the extent that they contri-
bute to or do not interfere with the power objec-
tive. They can be used ins trumentally as moral
justification for the power quest, but they must
be discarded the moment their application brings
weakness. The search for power is not made for
the achievement of moral values; moral values are
used to facilitate the attainment of power." ^
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Spykman's argument as to the use of moral purpose to
justify the attainment of power was rejected in the previous
section taking the opposite view of power for the attainment
of moral purposes. However, either view recognizes the ne-
cessity for power in the attainment of goals and both ultimately
demand definition of the power objective.
It does not suffice merely to say that power is the
objective if only for the reason that Harold and Margaret
Sprout have observed: "Though the word "power" is used con-
stantly in the language of politics, the concept of power , for
which the word stands, varies widely from one context to
3
another." Indeed, Robert Lieber discovered in his survey of
the literature that "one survey of power as a concept has
4found seventeen different definitions."
Lieber continues his arguments by drawing on K.J. Holsti's
observation that "power concepts are not useful for all aspects
of the study of international politics." Based on his own
research and the evident futility of finding a power model
that will serve as an adequate descriptor of all international
relations he concludes that "it (the power concept) cannot
function satisfactorily as the theoretical core of interna-
tional relations."
However, before doing so Lieber outlines Deutsch's four
categorizations of power, at least one of which serves as a





2- probability of imposing change
3- ability to shift the probability of outcomes
4- currency in the exchange of social functions (6)
A combination of the second and third categories provides
a useful perspective for describing the view of power which is
to be offered here, and which will now be given the nomenclature
"influence." In Global Politics , James Lee Ray attempts to
7draw a distinction between "power" and "influence." Unfortu-
nately, he succeeds only to the point of enlightening us that
a difference exists but stops short of making the distinction
clear.
David J. Bell, however, goes into considerable detail in
making the distinction. He attempts to highlight the distinc-
tion by way of three slightly dissimilar paradigms.
1- "If you do X, I will do Y"
2- "If you do X, you will do (feel, experience, etc,)Y"
3- "If you do X, He (God) will do Y" (8)
These paradigms are useful because they show the distinc-
tion between the various frameworks within which the recipient
makes his choice. In the first paradigm one actor is clearly
trying to exert some measure of compellance, through either a
threat or a promise, on another actor. The latter two, show
a kind of environmental effect which the actors choice will
stimulate, implying that the result (Y) will have some positive
or negative reward for the actor.
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However, while these paradigms help to clarify the nature
of the influence relationship between two actors, they do not
postulate as to what exactly it is that makes the recipient
in such a relationship undertake such an action. Klaus Knorr
argues that the utility of military power (U) is equal to the
sum of the values achieved (V) minus the sum of the cost (C)
.
U = (V^ ^ V^ + •••V„) - (C^ - S ^---^n' (9^
A variation of this formula can be applied to Bell's
paradigms to illustrate the utility of the influence relation-
ship in the more general context; that is, a context where
influence includes all the variables of the relationship such
as military sanctions, economic rewards or sanctions, etc.
Such a formula begins with two nations (A) and (B) , and
addresses the three paradigms suggested by Bell in terms of
what makes country A do (X) when presented with outcome (Y)
.
All three paradigms (if you do X; I will do Y, you will
do Y, or He will do Y) suggest that a certain action x, has a
specified outcome y-, , and that some other action, say x^ has
specified outcome y^. The outcomes (y) may be as a result of
what country B does when country A chooses action X; or out-
come (Y) may be a result of an environmental change induced
when A chooses action X. Nonetheless, country A will choose
action x-, if and only if (assuming rational behavior) : the
rewards gained (ZR) minus the costs incurred (EC) , as a result




In other words country A will choose x, over x^ if and
onlv if X, such that ER , - ZC , > SR ~ - EC -, .
1 yl yl y2 y2
Realizing that the summation of rewards or values gained by
country A is equal to the direct rewards to A minus the rewards
to B which imply a cost to A, (i.e. Soviet invasion of Poland
may bring about immediate pacification but underlying hatred
and increased future resolve) , and that the same relationship
holds true for the summation of costs, the inequality may
actually be expanded. However, for the purpose of this study
the inequality may simplified merely by recognizing that the
concern here is with the net reward (either positive or negative)
and by assigning a value (Q) to that net reward. So that
Q-, = ER 1 - EC I . Thus, country A will choose x-, over x^
when the change y, , which may be an action by B or a change
produced in the environment, produces a Q, which is higher
than Q2, produced by y2.
Nation B, then, has influence over nation A when it is
able to mold the relationship such that the behavior it seeks
from A offers greater net reward, or a lower net cost, to A
than the alternative.
In attempting to highlight the difference between raw
power and the influence relationship Ray refers to the
Vietnam debacle. He cites as one example the fact that the
North had a basically agrarian economy not particularly
vulnerable to the strategy of massive bombing campaigns. He
notes that, had their economy relied more heavily on industry
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such a strategy might more easily have influenced their
behavior.
This example is totally consistent with the approach
offered here. The outcome y, , in this case a threat of
massive bombing, could not increase the cost C -, sufficiently
enough to make the net result Q, higher than Qj Clearly
Hanoi opted for the latter.
There remains only one aspect of the influence concept
presented here that has not been addressed. The initiator,
the nation seeking a response from the other nation, can
never be assured that it will be able to totally control the
environment. Therefore, the initiator's goal is to maximize
the "probability" that the net result Q will be higher for
the threat, promise, or environmental change Y, than that of
However, it is not the intent, nor is it within the scope
of this study, to develop a conclusive methodology for the
precise measurement of the influence relationship. It is
the aim, however, to make clear to the student of foreign
policy decision making, as well as to the decision maker him-
self, what the influence relationship really entails. It
should be clearly understood that one nation can influence
another to behave in the desired fashion only when it can
shape the "total" environment so as to produce outcomes which
give the recipient nation a higher net gain, or lower net cost
than the alternative behavior.
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B. INGREDIENTS OF INFLUENCE
While the conceptual framework of influence presented in
the above discussion suggests a slight departure from more
conventional approaches, such a view does not require a revolu-
tionary departure from the general consensus of how a nation
acquires this influence. Although considerable liberties are
taken in the literature to juxtaposition the terms "power" and
"influence," there appears to be some degree of unanimity in
describing the elements which contribute to their utility
value. These elements can generally be categorized into econo-
mic, military, and political/ideological variables for the dis-
cussion of influence as it is viewed in this study.
Ray Cline's politectonic approach to power serves as a
convenient point of reference to derive these categories.
Simply stated, the politectonic approach is a means for Cline
to "emphasize that the kind of power we are talking about is
essentially political, economic and military." He arrives
at a formula which facilitates the incorporation of a host
of variables to express the measure of a nation's relative
power. This formula would assign to perceived power (P ) a
value equal to: the sum of Critical Mass (C) , Economic
Capability (E) , and Military Capability (M) ; times the sum
of National Strategy (S) , and National Will (W) . It is
expressed as
:
P = (C + E + M) X (S + W) . (12)
By grinding through this checklist the author is able to
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derrive a power coefficient for every nation. Unfortunately,
while the result may provide a valid measurement of a nation's
capability, it does so only in terms of paradigm 1, "If you do
X, I will do Y." The quotient is a measure only of a nation's
capability to apply a given sanction (positive or negative),
but does not address a nation's ability to control the environ-
mental paradigms, where (Y) is a result of something other than
a direct sanction applied by the initiator.
Nonetheless, the validity of the multiplicative function
does not hinder the validity of the variables themselves as
the ones whichare indeed essential to the influence relation-
ship. As Cline himself readily admits in his introduction of
the politectonic approach, the "kinds of power" the concept
addresses are economic, military, and political. The simpli-
fication is readily apparent in that at least two of the
variables may be closely interrelated. Where Critical Mass
addresses population and territory, these elements can be
said to be subsets of the economic factor. This is particularly
evident if the factor is given the term "wealth," as Russet
attempts to do in "Inventory of Influence Bases." "^ Clearly,
the size of the population, its education level, and its per
capita income may be factored into an overall index which
can be called a wealth or economic factor. The same applies
to territory. Its size, as well as percent arable land, and
infrastructure can easily be factored into the same variable.
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Strategy and national will can also be incorporated into
one variable, but assigning a nomenclature is somehwat more
difficult. National will implies the nation's resolve to
apply a particular sanction. It should be noted that the
influence relationship described here consists of more than
a mere application of sanctions. While a nation's resolve
does enter into the equation it can also be seen as a subset
of a broader element which will ultimately contribute to the
nation's ability to control the environment.
Thus, Cline's model can be simplified and Ray's discussion
of "The Ingredients of Power" helps to clarify the simplifica-
tion. Ray breaks these ingredients down into tangible and
intangible factors, where the tangible factors colsely
parallel Cline's C + E + M, and the intangible facots are
14quite similar to S + W. Most authoritative works on the
elements which constitute "power" and/or ''influence" take a
similar view, but tend to differentiate the tangible factors
into economic and military. Not only does this appear
logically sound, but consensus in the literature tends to
support its validity.
In 1942, Spykman suggested that there are four kinds of
warfare which comprise a nation's power: Military, Economic,
Political, and Ideological. On the other hand, in 1946,
E.H. Carr described the elements of power as military, economic
16
and power over opinion. " While the concept of power has since
undergone significant evolution, the elements themselves have
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remained relatively stable. Bruce Russet calls these military
17power, wealth, and deference.
Whether the term applied to the intangible variables is
deference, political, ideological, or power over opinion,
these concepts all comprise the non-quantifiable political/
ideological contribution to the influence relationSihip , and
will be referred to as such in the forthcoming pages. Thus,
partly as a result of consensus in the literature, and partly
because the factors have at least some measure of logical
validity, the decision maker should concern himself with the
economic, military and political/ideological determinants of
the influence relationship. In seeking to maximize his nation's
ability to control that relationship the government official
must consider how these three factors increase or diminish
the nation's overall influence in the environment.
C. THE INGREDIENTS IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Before proceeding into the second major discussion topic
of this paper, which involves the application of the model,
it will be necessary to explicate the role that these elements
play in the international balance of influence. Since this
paper will eventually focus directly on U.S. influence and
the Replublic of the Philippines, it is appropriate to draw
on Robert Pringle's introduction to the problem he addresses
in Indonesia and the Philippines : American Interests in
Island Southeast Asia, Here he highlights three braod areas
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of American interests which appear to closely parallel the
elements of influence suggested above.
"Security interests mainly involve interaction among
great powers. We must remain concerned that no
hostile power control the region to our disadvantage
. . .Economic interests include growing levels of trade
and investment plus access to some important natural
resources, including oil and minerals ... (and) ideo-
logical is the most subtle and controversial. We
want to live in a world which in so far as possible
is compatible with what we regard as universal
human rights, including political freedom." ^^
While these elements may or may not be ultimate interests
as described in the discussion of the interest topology, their
role in the international balance remains crucial. Moreover,
if this paper is to present a model which can ultimately be
applied to American foreign policy toward any part of the
world, it must necessarily begin with an analysis of these
determinants in the global environment.
The attempt here will be to emphasize the importance of
these three variables particularly with respect to the U.S.
relationship with Third World countries. The Republic of
the Philippines (R.P) is a Third World nation and a member
of the Group of 77. For this reason the U.S, position with
respect to developing nations is the focus of this discussion.
In this context Soviet influence and power is pervasive
but relies mainly on its military arm.
"Moscow seeks to improve its worldwide political
influence as a corollary of its expanding military
power. Washington seeks to retain global influence
but U.S. military power no longer clearly dominant
in East Asia and Pacific. U.S. economic influence
still vast and pervasive while Soviet economic
clout remains relatively minor." ^^
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As indicated in the above observation made by a writer
for Far East Economic Review, Soviet influence is on the up-
swing, at least in terms of the military factor, while the
U.S. is on the decline. However, Scott Thompson has observed
an overall enfeeblement on the part of the U.S. which must
eventually be redressed.
"The combination of an enfeeblement of Western
will at a time of Soviet growth in strength- at
the strategic level, to one of superiority no
later than the early 1980's (and, in my own view,
in the 1977-78)- appears to be sufficient to change
the assumption of how the world is organized: from
one previously dominated by the West and its friends,
to one in which Moscow is predominant, with the
rules of the game shifting ' pari-passu ' ." ^^
Although all three aspects of the influence equation will
be addressed, it seems logical, since the American emphasis
is thought to be mainly economic, to begin the discussion
with an analysis of the economic determinant of influence.
1 . Economic
The outlook for the future of the non-oil exporting
developing nations is cloudy at best. However, a decline in
the economic prosperity of the developing nations has a
certain impact on the growth of the developed market economies
as well. Therefore, the effort here will be to show the
effects of this relationship and its significance to U.S.
global influence. The premise is that future economic inter-
actions which contribute to the development of Third World
nations are of a high priority for the U.S. They are of a
high priority not because of moral commitments but because
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their decline directly diminishes our global influence in
the economic sector.
A recent U.N. World Economic Survey illustrates that
the prospects for growth in the Third World will undergo
some crucial tests in the years ahead.
"For the non-oil exporting developing nations, one
feature common to both 1974-75 and 1979-1980 is
the unfavorable consequences for their growth of
sharply rising prices in the world economy and
recession in the developed market economies . "^1
Moreover, the role of the developed market economies
in the decline of the developing nations is not negligible.
"The situation of the non-oil exporting developing
nations is aggravated at the present time by the
course of events and policies in the developed
market economies. These economies are currently
seeking to moderate domestic inflation partly by
restricting aggregate demand and expenditure. In
so doing, these countries reduce their demand for
imports and shift external pressure on to their
trading partners. In the aggregate, this means
that pressure will be shifted from the developed
market economies to the developing countries ."^^
By contributing to the decline of Third World nations
U.S. global influence is hurt in two ways: it provokes a
kind of unification on the part of these nations to combat
the shifting pressures; and, it directly stimulates further
decline of the developed market economies while at the same
time sacrificing future opportunities
.
a. Unification
Developing nations are not likely to idly watch
their position and their bargaining power deteriorate.
Though it is not likely that the Group of 77 will develop
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into a 77 member cartel along OPEC lines (monopoly over a
specific commodoty would have to exist for such a cartel to
be effective) , the Third World is trying to improve its power
base. Professor Martin Bronfenbrenner addresses the common
purpose of the developing nations:
"The unifying idea behind all these thing is the
desire to increase the bargaining power of Idcs
(less developed countries) against mdcs (more
developed countries) over a broad range of inter-
national issues relative to trade, to aid, and to
the international transfers of both capital and
technology
.
What seems to have developed is a collection
of selfserving Idc theories of international
economic relations, summarized under the glittering
head of 'A New International Economic Order. I Of
this collection, .. .UNCTAD (in concert with other
Idc dominated U.N^ agencies) has become the leading
world spokesmen. ^-^
The problem is not necessarily in the collective
power that these organizations may wield, the problem is to
avoid their using this power to the detriment of the U.S.
The goal, therefore, lies in persuading these nations to
follow policies based on reciprocity. Unfortunately, the
U.S. has not always been able to accomplish this goal while
others have. OPEC for one, has had some measure of success
in dealing with the rest of the Third World. As Nathaniel
Leff points out, OPEC has been able to steer the course of
the New International Economic Order in its own favor.
"Continued focus on the NIEO issue has thus come
to fill a different international role: providing
LDC political support for OPEC for its oil pricing
policies. With superb diplomatic skill, OPEC has
succeeded in maintaining the allegiance of the oil
importing LDCs-despite the impact of higher petroleum
prices on Third World economic growth, foreign debt,
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and external dependency. OPEC has achieved this
feat, not by selling the LDCs oil at substantially
concessionary prices, but by offering its support
to them on behalf of the NIEO." 24
Thus if the U.S. fails to recognize the importance
of the Third World in the international economic order, a
minimum conjecture that can be made is that their collective
power can and will be used in ways that will detract from
our overall capability. In this instance, it is directly
by way of supporting oil price increases.
b. Direct Decline and Future Opportunities
One may argue that policies which hinder U.S.
growth ultimately hurt the LDCs even more, and that surely
these nations will soon have to forego their support for
OPEC. But, indeed according to the World Economic Survey
recession appears to impact growth less adversely in develop-
ing countries than in the major industrialized ones.
"The recession and its aftermath had a particularly
strong impact on the growth of the manufacturing
sector. For several reasons, this sector is most
severely affected by a deterioration in the external
environment. In the first place, manufacturing
production is more dependent upon imported inputs
than other sectors of the economy. Secondly, the
generally depressive effects on aggregate demand
of a large increase in current account deficits
tend to fall particularly strongly on the demand
for manufactures, the concumption of which can be
more readily curtailed than it can for agricultural
products. Thirdly, the drop in the demand for
manufactured exports affects manufacturing produc-
tion in a number of countries that have adopted
export oriented growth strategies ." 25
But, while global recession impacts negatively
on the developed market economies moreso than on the developing
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nations and is therefore a major reason for concern, the
correlation between Third World economies and U.S. influence
need not be restricted to pejority.
Once again, one need not resort to emotive reason-
ing to justify the need for contributing to the development
of LDCs . The U.S. does, after all, have much to gain from
closer economic interaction. Growth in Third World economies
represents opportunities for positive gain by way of new
markets, access to energy and raw materials.
"Given the already existing state of mutual depen-
dency between the industrial powers and the less
developed countries, a former State Department
official has prescribed the following trade-off:
'We need to strike a great bargain in which access
to energy and other raw materials, which indus-
trialized countries need, is traded for other kinds
of access which the developing countries need-access
to markets at stable and remunerative prices, access
to technology, management skills, and investment
capital and access to a fairer share of decision
making in international ins titutions . " 26
An economic relationship with the Third World
based on such reciprocity paves the way for future gains on
the part of both actors. While it may appear from the notation
above that the LDCs are acquiring access to markets, favorable
prices, technology and countless other benefits in exchange
for raw materials and energy, it should be noted that the
latter list of benefits often applies to developed market
economies as well
.
"...economic development is bound to create new and
rapidly expanding markets for capital equipment im-
ported from the developed countries. This equipment
will be needed both in the newly established industries
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and in the modernization of agriculture. The
creation of import replacement industries to
manufacture capital goods would reuqire a high
level of technology, vast resources of capital
and skilled labor, and a large domestic market
...Economic development will raise the purchasing
power of consumers in the developing countries.
They will be able to afford products of higher
quality and greater sophistication than the
inexpensive basic consumer items that alone were
within their reach in the past. These far more
complex and expensive consumer good, especially
durables such as motor vehicles and electric
appliances can be bought only from the developed
markets." 2 7
The Third World and indeed the entire spectrum
of global economic relations represents a lucrative source
of economic power. Unfortunately, the United States has
often failed to recognize the connection between economic
strength and its overall effect on the ability to achieve
interests. Thus, while U.S. exports account for 8 percent
of GNP, we "do not seem to fully recognize the importance of
trade for employment, income investment, and economic growth
at home."
In 1975, U.S. trade with Third World countries
in general comprised some 25 percent of overall trade. Exports
amounted to $23,414 million out of a $107,652 million total,
while imports accounted for $20,062 million out of $96,903
million total. This led to an overall $3,352 million balance
29in favor of the U.S. In addition, the compostion of this
trade lends credence to the fact that reduction in demand
for manufactures has a tremendous impact on our export sector.
The 1973 composition shows exports in primary products
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comprising 24.4 percent of developed market economy exports,
and 74.5 percent of developing market economy exports, while
manufactured products comprised 74.3 percent for the former
and 24.8 percent for the latter.
Therefore, not only are favorable economic rela-
tions with the Third World necessary in terms of the collective
power these nations may wield in the future, but the direct
impact on the U.S. economy in terms of further decline and
lost opportunity is equally vital,
c. Economic Summary
The significance of the economic determinant of
global power cannot be overemphasized. Whether or not economic
prosperity lies at the very core of the U.S. national interest
topology is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that
"global influence" lies at the very core of a nation's ability
to achieve anything, and economic strength is a vital contri-
butor to that ability.
Third World collective power and direct decline
or lost opportunity are, therefore, two aspects of U.S.
economic relationships with developing nations that warrant
closer attention. A recent Congressional study mission to East
Asia highlights the unfavorable trends we must seek to reverse
and very effectively summarizes this section.
"Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to drift without
any clear policy directives for our world trade.
Deeply absorbed with its large domestic economy,
the U.S. neglects foreign trade interests. There
is no question that this neglect has been instru-
mental in bringing about the decline of the U.S.
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share in the East Asia market. With this loss and
similar declining export competitiveness in other
sectors of the world, comes a whole train of un-
desirable domestic U.S. problems - reduced growth,
lost income, inflationary pressures, unemployment,
international dollar erosion, and, inevitably de-
clining prestige among world powers. Underlying
these factors has been poor economic performance
at home, including slowdown in productivity growth
and very high rates of inflation.
It is imperative that the U.S. restore its
economic productivity and reverse the deterioration
of American economic, political and security
positions in the world. As part of this effort,
American business enterprises, the U.S. Congress
and the Administration must give far higher priority
to developing strong export markets. Failure to
do so will be at national peril." ^^
2 . Military
In an era of clear strategic superiority the United
States may have been able to pursue its own interests under
the nuclear umbrella which held the Soviet challenge in check.
However, as the era of "parity" and "essential equivalence"
unfolded a new stage in the military aspect of global influence
was ushered in. This new era is characterized by diminished
emphasis on the nuclear environment as a means to dissuade
potential adversaries from hostile adventurism or uninvited
expansionism. In this environment global influence requires
increased emphasis on military strength by way of conventional
capabilities throughout key strategic areas of the world.
The nuclear deterrent must continue to be maintained, but
the nature of the Soviet threat has become clearer. It appears
now that the greatest challenge lies in Soviet attempts to
redefine the limits of their regional theatre of influence.
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A recent Rand study, prepared for the United States
Air Force by Frederick Sallagar, indicates that Russian
nuclear parity and overall military superiority has led to
a situation whereby the Soviet Union will adopt a new global
military strategy. He argues that our inability to hide be-
hind the nuclear umbrella, and indeed, our inability to use
the nuclear threat at all, save for a direct attack on the
U.S., opens the way for Soviet overtures in areas where the
United States is not prepared to offer realistic resistance.
"Among the effects of the policy has been to
disrupt global stability, and to encourage or
allow local troublemakers to create situations
that may sooner or later require American inter-
vention in a critical area. This could precipi-
tate a military confrontation with Soviet or
Soviet supported forces, and thus become a more
likely source of war between the superpowers
than a direct Soviet attack on the United
States." 32
Once again reference to the concept of interests and
the role of influence helps to put military power in the
proper perspective. Though interests may remain undefined,
influence is required to achieve them. The U.S. must
recognize that there are international actors who consider
military power a prime determinant in the influence formula.
Therefore, the military factor of American global influence
is vital.
Unfortunately, while the U.S. has opted to pursue a
forward basing strategy, it has too frequently been reluctant
to pursue this strategy with the necessary fervor. The
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United States must recognize the importance of these forward
military operating bases not only in terms of the regional
strength they provide, but also as a signal of American global
resolve. Failure to recognize this importance will lead once
again to vacillatory policy which may indeed result in the
loss of key strategic installations.
While the Rand study is instrumental in pointing out
the character of the Soviet threat, Edward Luttwak's "The
Strategy of Inaction" elucidates the consequences of failure
to signal our determination to counter this threat on a global
scale. Professor Luttwak looks at the failure of "U.S. counter-
intervention policy due to lack of tenacity." He accuses the
Carter administration of ingenuity in "devising excuses for
inaction in the face of Soviet activism in Africa," and indeed,
throughout the Third World. His thesis, however, is that
"the problem of Soviet imperialism must be confronted at its
source; and not in its outward manifestation; only a rehabili-
tation of American power can deal with the threat."
Although his discussion is centered about the Third
World, relying heavily on the African theatre, the implications
are global and the Southeast Asia contribution specifically,
looms large in this perspective. Richard Walker's analysis
of the U.S. Trans-Pacific Alliances complements Luttwak's
view in the Southeast Asia region. He cites Richard Rosencrance
in observing that "crosscutting alignments and even contradic-
tory interests can prevent a return to bipolar animosities
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and reduce the chances for the outbreak of international vio-
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lence. However, crosscutting interest must be counterbalanced
with crosscutting power of equal magnitude. Thus he stipulates
that:
"The next few years of efforts to maintain credibi-
lity for the American defensive shield, given the
seeming decline in major threats, could paradoxically
be the most crucial. In order to further the plu-
ralization of interests and associations and encourage
diffusion of power in the Pacific area, the United
States will have to be especially careful to avoid
moves that could prove destabilizing or that could
be interpreted as an invitation for the sort of
gamble the North Korean communists made in June
1950. American credibility remains a key factor
in Pacific stability ." 55
But yet, this is precisely the global impact which
strategic withdrawal from the military installations in the
R.P. would have. Such a withdrawal, apart from its implications
on one realistic defense posture, would signal the lack of
American resolve which Luttwak argues is crucial in the
contemporary power environment. Luttwak repudiates four
administration excuses for inaction:
1- that the Soviet Union is a second rate power
and has little ability to influence events
beyond its borders
2- the denial of the lasting consequences of
Soviet activism
3- that Soviet economic power does not have the
ability to maintain influence
4- that an increase in Soviet influence is not a
decrease in our own.
52

Having clearly established the invalidity of these
argument he postulates that the real danger of declining
military influence is that it redefines zones of demarcation
wherein Soviet adventurism was heretofore unacceptable. He
argues that "The military balance is manifest precisely in
defining the limits of each country's natural sphere, and in
.
shaping general conceptions of what is normal and acceptable
conduct." Further, he does not hesitate to predict Soviet
action following the vacuum left by American withdrawals.
"Once the realities of power become manifest in the outlook of
all concerned, action becomes feasible, and if it is Soviet
action, a perfectly plausible justification will soon be
37forthcoming also."
Such is the impact which American strategic withdrawal
would have on our ability to exert global influence. A recent
U.S. Army War College study observes the global connotations
attached to such a withdrawal particularly with respect to
the Philippines. "Withdrawal of U.S. influence and military
presence in the Pacific nurtures the concept and the percep-
tion that U.S. status as a world power is in the early stages
38
of its demise."
Thus, if the Soviet Union seeks to increase its glo-
bal influence and its major emphasis involves redefining the
spheres of acceptable military involvement, then the U.S.
should be prepared to deal with this threat on an equal footing.
Failure to maintain a credible strategic commitment throughout
various parts of the world could have severe global implications
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for the U.S. and for its overall ability to influence. Robert
Scalapino's observation of U.S. policy alternatives in Asia
highlights these global implications and serves as a convenient
summarization of the military factor.
In "U.S. Policy Alternatives in Asia" Scalapino looks
at policy alternatives in the region and repudiates the propo-
sition that the U.S. should adopt a thesis that it is a Pacific
and not an Asian power. Further, he discusses the imlications
which "the resultant withdrawal of all strategic commitments
from Asia." would have on U.S. bargaining positions. His
contention is that such a withdrawal would have catastrophic
effects because it would hinder intense protracted negotia-
tions with the Chinese as well as the Russians over issues
such as arms control, economic relations, and the future
39international order itself.
Real military capability as well as the perception of
American global military resolve are, therefore, vital elements
in the international influence equation and warrant increased
emphasis on the part of American decision makers.
3. Political/Ideological
Developing nations, and particularly the Philippines,
are involved in a process of seeking their own political des-
tinies. To insist that U.S. interests can only be pursued in
an atmosphere of total global democracy is not only unrealistic,
it also risks the danger of alienating those nations which are
either not prepared for the democratic system, or do not want
54

to use the model for whatever reasons. The mere fact that
their situations are not conducive to democratic forms does
not imply that these nations are communist or even if they are,
that they are necessarily hostile to the U.S.
In "The Third World and the Conflict of Ideologies"
Max Beloff argues that these nations may not be ready for
either style ideology-communist or democratic. He stresses
that in those situations where Leninist models for party
structure and Maoist ideas of guerilla warfare have been used
in overthrowing existing rulers, the ideology involved for the
construction of new states is irrelevent. Both the communist
line and the Western democracies presuppose:
"a high degree of authority on the part of the state,
and a governmental machine that has a conception of
common goals and is not simply a means for personal
enrichment or social promotion; they also presuppose
already existing cadres of skilled workers and pro-
fessional people 40
But the overriding point is that "in a large part of
41the Third World these preconditions are not met." But, if
these conditions are not met and we cannot be certain of what
the political structure will be-how will the political variable
contribute to U.S. global influence?
The solution is not to be so overconcerned with ideology
that the influence goal suffers disproportionately. It should
be remembered that while ideological principles may at times
be at the very forefront of American national interest, they
are subject to shifts in prioritization. Thus, since the
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overriding concern is the effect which a particular policy
based on ideology has on U.S. global influence. In this
context the only requirement the U.S. should demand in the
political forum is a form of government with which the U.S.
can reasonably coexist. Admittedly, in our system this bears
a concomitant requirement of freedom from repression. But,
to what extent does this hinder our ability to relate to
different ideologies? Clearly, the fact that the People's
Republic of China is a communist regime (or perhaps better
stated-Maoist regime) , has not stood in the way of friendly
negotiations along cultural, economic, and perhaps in the
not too distant future, military issues.
As Robert Pringle puts it: "If the Philippines, or
others, move toward democracy on their own terms, whether
revolutionary or evolutionary, we should applaud and make
42
every effort to increase cooperation after the fact." This
is the kind of political forum that will realistically enhance
our global influence, not a childish pursuit of trying to
attain what is unrealistic to attain-global democracy and
human rights.
The Soviet Union has its ideological foundation, but
they differ in that they recognize the political realities of
the international system, and are therefore, flexible in how
ardently they cling to their ideology at any given situation.
"The rulers of the Soviet Union... are of course
ultimately inspired by an ideological commitment,
but they have avoided allowing their activities in
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the Third World to be robbed of flexibility by con-
siderations of ideological purity ... Since the Soviet
rulers preserve at home a highly structured bureau-
cratic regime ... they are in a strong position to
cultivate the advantages that J:he conflict of
ideologies confers on them."
However, it is not necessary that the U.S. follow the
Soviet lead in shedding all moral consciousness merely to be
aligned with the strongest faction within each country. What
is necessary is to be realistic in pursuing the American
system of values for other nations, since these may not be
relevent to their societies. The U.S. must establish mutual
understandings with those nations that, while not necessarily
consistent with American internal values, are not necessarily
repulsive to their own societal values.
Strobe Talbott offers some suggestions as to how the
U.S. should deal with distasteful distatorships . He suggests
four alternatives.
"First, the U.S. should be especially wary of
embracing dictatorships that have sprung up in
countries with democratic traditions, like Chile
and Greece . .
.
Second, the U.S. has more reason to regard a strict
perhaps unsavory regime in a country as viable if
that country faces an external threat...
Third, it is wiser to support a regime in a country
that has a system for assuring a measure of con-
tinuity than in a nation that does not."
But, perhaps the most salient point, and the one which
will have continuing significance as this study progresses into
the regional and national scales, is his last assertion.
"Finally the U.S. should be acutely sensitive to
fundamental and widespread changes in the nature






of the U.S., and an increased willingness on the
part of democratic moderates to make common cause
with leftist extremists. Where that happens, as
it is happening now in the Philippines, the U.S.
would do well to step up regular diplomatic commu-
nication with the moderates and thus help strengthen
them." 44
The international political order will contribute to
American global influence only when nations can seek their own
destiny and the U.S. helps them in so doing. The Nixon Doc-
trine is just such an example of how this rubric contributes
to the American ability to realize net gains, in the very
sense. In indicating to the Chinese that the United States
would not abandon its Asian allies but that each would play
an increasingly significant role not only in determining their
own future but in their own defense as well, the Chinese
became convinced that "militarily strong and politically
independent nations in Asia offered an important counterbalance
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to increased Soviet strength in the region."
This new outlook on the part of the Chinese helped to
pave the way for significant gains in the U.S. ability to play
the China card with respect to the Soviet Union. Clearly
this aspect has increased the American ability to achieve its
own interests since it has provided us with a measure of in-
fluence not currently enjoyed by the Soviet Union.
The political/ideological determinant in the influence
relationship is, therefore, a vital link in the American
ability to achieve its national interests. Whether by way of
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promoting democratic principles, when this presents a realis-
tic goal, or by way of tolerating an unpopular dictatorship
while at the same time seeking dialogue with the wave of the
future within these nations, the American goal should seek
interaction within a political forum which best contributes
to our global influence.
D. SUMMARY
The main emphasis in this chapter has been merely to
propose that the decision maker must be concerned with the
ability to achieve the national interest topology regardless
of how that space is eventually defined. In the international
arena there is no existing organization which can automatically
guarantee any nation its interests or even the right to pursue
its interests peacefully. Therefore, the nature of interna-
tional politics is such that power, or influence as it is
viewed in this study, is the vehicle through which nations
seek to protect and promote their own individual interests.
Since the ability to influence international actors is
the only means through which interests are secured, a thorough
understanding of "influence" on a conceptual level is crucial.
While there are a host of techniques available to measure
national power there appears to be some divergence in the
literature as to its application. The fact that a nation has more
more units of power than another does not necessarily imply
that it can compel or persuade another nation to behave in a
certain way. The only sure way to guarantee such behavior is
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to present that nation with a set of choices such that the
choice you seek from them represents a higher gain or a lower
cost than the alternative.
This can be expressed in a simple formula. Where nation
B seeks choice x, from nation A vis-a-vis choice x- , B must
be able to control the respective outcomes y, and y- such
that the net gain ("R ) minus the net cost (ZC ) are greater
fo r y, than they are for y-. Or
X, such that ZR ^ - EC , > ER ^ - EC ^1 yl yl y2 y2
This formula, while by no means suggesting to provide
conclusive methodology for the precise measurement of influence,
does help to clarify the real essence of the concept. That is,
if rationality is assumed, nations will act the way one wants
them to only when such action maximizes their gain or minimizes
their loss
.
But, while there is considerable divergence with regard
to the concept, there is relative unanimity with regard to the
variables which contribute to national influence. Various
scholars distinguish between four variables, while others
argue for three. For the purposes of this study most varaibles
can be incorporated into two general categories : tangible and
intangible. Two tangible elements, however, are seldom com-
bined. These are the military and economic elements. Since
the distinction between these two elements appears logically
valid and the literature tends to support the differences,
the tangible factor has been broken down into the military
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and economic elements. The intangible factors have been
incorporated into one, political/ideological, variable.
What emerges is a situation where three distinct variables
are seen as the primary composites of a nation's global in-
fluence. The decision maker must, therefore, be concerned
with the role that these variables play in contributing to or
detracting from American global influence. With this in mind
the chapter proceeds into an analysis of the three determi-
nants of national influence on a global scale.
Economic relations with the Third World based on reciprocal
benefit is seen as vital to future U.S. global economic influ-
ence. The nature of the Soviet threat requires increased
emphasis on the part of the U.S. to increase its ability to
check Soviet initiatives/adventurism throughout various parts
of the world. Finally, the political/ideological evolution
of many of the developing nations requires the U.S. to take
a realistic approach in dealing with these nations. Not only
are many of these nations not prepared for democracy, many do
not wish to use the model. This does not necessitate hostile
or even unfriendly relations, rather it necessitates a
political dialogue which recognizes their sovereignty while
seeking to protect and promote our own capability.
Thus, the model which has been proposed is one in which
the decision maker is cognizant of the relationship between
the national interest topology and American global influence
to achieve the same. In seeking to improve one's own ability
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to achieve interests one must seek to maximize his own economic,
military, and political/ideological strength, since these are
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IV. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PHILIPPINES
Part one of this thesis was primarily an attempt to illus-
trate the necessity for taking a broader view of U.S. objectives
with respect to other nations. It was argued that foreign
policy should not be based on any single precise definition of
the national interest for several reasons. First, the concept
is nebulous and there is considerable disagreement as to its
interpretation. Moreover, the difficulty of defining the na-
tional interest within our own borders becomes exponentially
more difficult when it is projected to U.S. national interests
in another country. Second, such a precise definition is
subject to change as the mood of the nation shifts within the
domestic environment.
Therefore, U.S. foreign policy should be based on the
nation's ability to influence international actors. This
ability is acquired through economic, military, and political/
ideological strength which enables a nation to control the
outcomes of another's actions. The goal is to control these
three variables such that the results of the behavior one seeks
from other nations represents a higher reward or lower cost
for them than the alternative.
As the study now attempts to apply this braoder vie\^ to
U.S. policy toward the Philippines one would naturally expect
an analysis of how the U.S. relationship with that nation can
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be made to contribute to America's ability to achieve its
national interest topology. By applying the model suggested,
the immediate question becomes: how does the U.S. relationship
with the Philippines contribute to U.S. global influence?
The same question, in negative terms, helps to clarify the
problem. In other words, how would total divestiture of
relationships with the Philippines affect U.S. global influence?
In order to deal with this question it is necessary to
analyze the three elements of global influence in terms of the
Philippine external environment. The U.S. relationship with
the Philippines can, in this sense, be seen as vital, for its
contribution to U.S. influence in Southeast Asia is signigicant.
However, if U.S. policy objectives in the Philippines are to
be couched in terms of how the islands contribute to U.S.
regional influence, then it will be necessary to defend the
need for U.S. influence in the region.
The ingredients of influence are vital to the U.S. ability
to influence world events in general. A strong U.S. economic,
military, and political/ideological position in Southeast Asia
is essential if the U.S. is to exert its influence in inter-
national events, not only in Southeast Asia, but in the Middle
East and Northeast Asia.
Therefore, in applying the proposed model, these final
chapters will address U.S. influence and the policy alterna-
tives available to acquire it. Chapter IV will attempt to
elucidate the significance of U.S. economic, military, and
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political/ideological strength in Southeast Asia; and, the
role of the U.S. relationship with the Philippines in contri-
buting to or detracting from this regional influence. Chapter
V will delve into the Philippine internal environment to prog-
nosticate as to possible future developments and their impli-
cations for U.S. policy objectives. Various scenarios will
be discussed so as to select possible courses of action
available to the U.S. to improve or maintain its influence in
the Philippines and the Southeast Asia region.
The main emphasis of this chapter is to examine the
proposition that a continued American involvement in Southeast
Asia is essential for the exercise of U.S. global influence.
The role of the U.S. relationship with the Philippines, as a
contributor to regional influence, will be analyzed to
determine the need for a continued American military presence
on the islands within a hospitalbe political environment.
A. U.S. INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The American national interest may include a host of
interrelated values and needs many of which require interaction
with various nations of the world. Specifically, economic,
military, and political/ideological strength in the Southeast
Asia region can have a significant impact on the U.S. ability
to influence world actors so as to achieve these interests.
Southeast Asia shows signs of developing into a lucrative
market and perhaps a crucial source of raw materials. To
neglect this strategic marketplace is to risk the possibility
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of losing access to it in the years ahead with negative reper-
cussions for U.S. economic strength. The political/ ideologi-
cal climate within most of the nations of Southeast Asia is in
a process of evolution where each nation is attempting to
determine its own political destiny. This political/ideologi-
cal dynamism, however, may be threatened by the goals of
certain other outside actors whose intentions are as yet
unclear, and whose main element of influence is military.
Before starting out on an analysis of these three varaibles
it is perhaps beneficial to gain an understanding of some of
the most recent developments in the region, particularly with
respect to the super-power, and major-power, bilateral and
trilateral relationships in the region. This aspect has
already been presented in the Far East Economic Review's Asia
1980 Yearbook
,
and is offered here as Appendix A.
One final glimpse into super-power objectives is perhaps
in order before commencing. A Praeger Special Study by Chawla,
Gurtov, and Marsot ( Southeast Asia Under the New Balance of
Power ) published in 1974 summed up the Soviet objectives in
the region.
"Despite Moscow's denials, Soviet actions imply
that the Asian collective security ideas as well
as Soviet efforts in the individual countries of
the area are primarily directed against the Chinese.
Moscow is certainly not interested in an ASEAN
sponsored neutralization that could well be either
a smokescreen for continued U.S. control and
influence, or a vacuum from which the U.S.S.R. is
excluded but the CPR (PRC) is not... The next few
years seem likely to witness an increase in
Sino-Soviet competition in Southeast Asia as the
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United States reduces its military presence and
as the Soviet Union seeks to fill that vacuum and
contain an increasingly assertive China."
-
With a basic appreciation for what these relationships
entail and what the objectives of some of the major actors
might encompass, the study focus is on the U.S. economic,
military, and political/ideological objectives in the area.
1 . Economic
The East and Southeast Asia region is a lucrative
marketplace and shows every sign of not only maintaining this
status but also of growing even more lucrative in the years
ahead. Of the $143,660 million in total U.S. exports for
1978, East Asia purchased $28,758 million for a full 20.0
percent. This ranked second only to West Europe. Appendix
B shows the extent of U.S. exports to East Asia, by commodi-
ty by country for 1978.
The East Asia Study Mission Report to the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress of January 1980, highlights
some of the general trends in the U.S. economic relationship
with East Asia. (The study mission designated East Asia as
the region from Burma eastward to China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Korea, Indonesia, The Philippines, New Zealand, Japan,
Australia, and some small island nations of the Pacific).
The first, is that U.S. two way trade with East Asia is now
equal to that of all of Europe. The second, is that East
Asia bought 10 percent of the manufactured exports of developed
countries in 1978, and for the United States it was even more
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important. The region purchased some 20 percent of the total
U.S. export volume, ranking second only to Europe which
accounted for 27.5 percent. The third point is perhaps the
most relevant to this discussion. That is, it was not
necessarily the developed countries of East Asia that bought
most U.S. exports since, the study mission found, developing
country imports grew faster in the 10 year period than did
4
the developed markets of Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
Not only have their imports grown significantly, their
overall rate of growth has kept a pace unmatched by the
developed market economies. The region's overall average rate
of growth is 7 percent with some nations posting a 10 percent
increase, while imports have increased 20 percent annually.
These figures are likely to grow as "U.S. Business Looks
at ASEAN." The Association of Southeast Asia Nations was
formed on August 8, 1967 as an organization to promote economic,
cultural, and political cooperation between the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (Appendix C)
.
Since then, ASEAN has had some ups and downs, but the fall
of Saigon and the invasion of Kampuchea have led to an inten-
sification of mutual cooperation while attempting to avoid
any military connotations. This has paved the way for a
revitalization of economic interests on the part of U.S.
business
.
The ASEAN countries have enjoyed an average 7 percent
growth rate in the last 10 years while the GNP growth for
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the industrialized nations has slowed to 3 or 4 percent.
Moreover, "ASEAN GNP will double by 1990 and the region will
7
energe as a new center of world economic power."
Oakley Johnson, director of Asian Pacific Affairs
section of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, describes the U.S.
economic interest in ASEAN.
"ASEAN 's rapid economic growth was better understood
by many U.S. executives who have come to share a
growing, worldwide confidence in the future of the
countries that constitute the ASEAN group.
Today, ASEAN-US commercial linkages are indeed
impressive. Two way trade amounted to over $16
billion in 1979, with a ^2.5 billion balance in
ASEAN's favor, mostly due to Indonesian oil exports.
This placed ASEAN as our fifth largest trading
partner... In 1979, US exports to ASEAN jumped an
astounding 47 percent and US private investment
grew to over $4 billion. Recent studies have
indicated that ASEAN is becoming an increasingly
attractive area for US foreig.n investment ... .Over
the past 12 years there has been a fourfold increase
in US investment based in part on consistently
higher rates of return for ventures in ASEAN as
compared with those of the rest of Asia and the
developing countries overall."
8
This increasing interest in the ASEAN region is re-
flected in the IMF statistics for 1977 trade. In 1977, ASEAN
alone purchased $7.7 billion from the U.S. selling, $3.9
billion in exports. This was 4.2 percent of the U.S. total
world trade for the year and 10 percent of the total U.S.
trade with developing nations. Moreover, the average annual
rate of growth for trade with the U.S. was 29.7 percent for
9the period 1973-77.
These figures indicate a substantial American interest
in the economic relationships with Southeast Asia, however,
73

there are a number of ambiguities. Although US exports have
increased significantly along with direct investment and the
overall trade position, it sould be remembered that the U.S.
share of the market is actually losing ground, particularly
in the wake of an ever increasing Japanese involvement.
The U.S. share of the regional market has fallen from 41
percent in 1960 to 34 percent in 1979.
The most recent set of IMF statistics reflects that
the U.S. competitive stance is still far from what it could
be. In 1979 Japan imported US $16,148 million from ASEAN
with over half that figure from Indonesia ($8,725 million,
a large portion of which consisted of oil imports. The U.S.,
on the other hand purchased only US $10,006 million with only
$3,925 million from Indonesia. On the export side, however,
Japan was able to sell US $9,577 million, while the U.S.
shipped only US $6,775 million to the same countries.
Although this decline is in relative terms only there
is real cause for concern. The U.S. may actually be investing,
and exporting more than ever before but the rate of growth
of the U.S.. share has not kept pace with that of Japan or
the rest of the world. For the following periods. East Asia




1969-78 1969-72 1972-75 1975-78
per annum growth in percent ^^
Growth of world
imports 19 15 28 15
Growth o£ East
Asia imports 21 15 33 15
Growth of East Asia
imports from U.S. 17 12 29 12
Growth of developing
East Asia country
imports 23 26 34 19
Growth of developing
East Asia country
imports from U.S. 21 15 35 IS
Bernard Gordon has addressed the decline in American
economic initiative in, "Japan, The United States, and South-
east Asia." He argues that where the United States presence
in the Pacific was based on a wide spectrum of "assistance,
trade and investment, education and cultural effort, and
defense"; there has now been a decline in most of those roles
"with only defense remaining a high priority of official con-
cern." He concludes that since our foreign policy requires
public acceptance and support, this will soon raise questions
about what the U.S. is there to defend.
Such decline in economic initiative contributes very
tangibly to a loss in overall global influence. What is
needed is recognition of the importance of U.S. involvement
in global economic relationships, and especially the signi-
ficance of the Southeast Asia market. ASEAN is not only a
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lucrative future market but how the U.S. relationship with
the countries of the region evolves can be seen as an indica-
tor of the U.S. relationship with Third World nations in the
long haul.
"Today ASEAN is seen less as an incipient alliance
than as an influential subsector of the Third World,
composed of relatively advantaged countries with
mixed economies, a like minded coalition with which
the United States should be able to cooperate in
its dealings with a sometimes hostile south.
Officials are fully aware that if 'moderates' such
as Indonesia and the Philippines become sufficiently
alienated, the result would be to stimulate economic
radicalism on a global scale."-'-
«
The United States must seek to reverse the trend of
economic vacillation which detracts from global prestige and
the ability to influence. In a report to the Joint Economic
Committee by the East Asia Study Mission of January 5-14,
1980 this negligence was highlighted
"The persistent and continuing trade and payments
deficits of the United States fuel inflation and
represent lost economic opportunity. Moreover,
they contribute to a loss of credibility of the
United States as a world leader ... Despite the
seriousness of these problems the U.S. has no
economic strategy to realistically cope with
them. "15
The Study Mission found that a major contributor to
the decline was .American disincentive by way of tax laws.
They recommended five revisions .16
1- enact corrective legislation on Sections 911 and
913 of the Internal Revenue Code to put Americans




2- offer tax credits for initial costs of developing
new foreign markets.
3- streamline administration of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and urge adoption of an international
code of business conduct.
4- revise the Webb Pomerene Act to give U.S. con-
sortiums the ability to compete for international
contracts
.
5- raise the funding leverage of the Ex-Im Bank to
help U.S. in winning multi-million dollar con-
tracts .
While these revisions may not cure the problems
entirely, they do at least represent a step in the right
direction towards improving the American position in global
economics, particularly in the realm of developing new markets
and specifically in East and Southeast Asia.
Not only island Southeast Asia but peninsular South-
east Asia and the mainland states as well, offer tremendous
opportunities for the expansion of U.S. global influence in
the economic sector. American economic influence in the
region is pervasive but to neglect its future potential is
to court disaster. Although Robert Pringle asserts that the
"American private sector is already the most potent agent of
1 7U.S. influence in island Southeat Asia," others, particularly
Bernard Gordon (note 13 above), point to the U.S. not keeping
pace with regional growth to question our ability to maintain
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this influence. To the extent that the area represents new
markets and trade potential as it develops economically, as
well as the extent to which this element of influence in the
region can contribute significantly to the U.S. global in-
fluence, this "ingredient" in the influence relationship
must rank high in the list of priorities.
2 . Military
Southeast Asia today is "undergoing its own transi-
tion from an unfortunate past to an uncertain future, albeit
1
8
with high hopes for what the future will hold." American
military capability in the region must, therefore, be couched
in terms of the role the U.S. will play in this transition.
Ignoring this role risks the possibility that regional actors
or even extra-regional actors might adopt certain propensities
to act in ways contrary to U.S. interests. The military
variables must, therefore , seek to provide the U.S. with the
measure of influence necessary to curtail such actions and
indeed to promote favorable behavior.
Unfortunately decision makers have all too frequently
addressed the question of military capabilities from a strictly
national perspective, or at best a regional scale, ignoring
the global implications of regional military power. In 1969
Senator Symington questioned Admiral Kauffman and General
Gideon during Seante hearings on the Philippines installations
to suggest the lack of any military threat to the island.

SENATOR SYMINGTON: What is the capacity from the
military standpoint of the Red Chinese today in
the Pacific to menace the Philippines from a mili-
tary standpoint since this is a military board?
ADMIRAL KAUFFMAN: I would say at the moment, sir,
very small . .
.
...SENATOR SYMINGTON: What you two are actually
saying, militarily speaking is there is no threat
to the Philippines, are you not?-'-^
Although this exchange took place over a decade ago,
it reflects the kind of narrow view of global influence which
has brought the U.S. to its current dilemma. Luckily, the
Philippine bases have survived but continued neglect of the
global implications of regional military power could have
catastrophic effects, particularly in the contemporary inter-
national environment.
In "Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives, (Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Programs Approprait ions for 1980)" The
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Richar Holbrooke, analyzed the Philippine bases from
a broader perspective.
"Recent increases in the Soveit Pacific fleet and
the need to maintain the military balance in the
Korean Peninsula are of immediate concern. These
situations have combined with the recent Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, growing Soviet influence in
Afghanistan, unrest in Pakistan and Iran, and Soviet
and Cuban military presence in Ethiopia and South
Yemen to raise questions among our friends and
allies and hopes among others. The Pacific defense
posture described in Secretary Brown's report, in
which our Philippine bases are so important as
forward bases, must be maintained if we are to
allay those doubts. "20
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The question Mr. Holbrooke referred to indicates
the necessity for a more pragmatic approach to how the U.S.
should view its military role in Southeast asia. This approach
raises two basic issues: two-way traffic to and from the
Middle East and the Indian Ocean; and, one nation dominance
of the Southeast Asia region. Clearly, the U.S. will have
some role, positive or negative, with respect to these issues.
The decision maker must, therefore, have a thorough under-
standing of just what that role entails.
a. The Indonesian "Sea Wall"
The Indian Ocean and the Middle East is a
veritable hotbed of controversy. Not only is the region po-
tentially unstable from within, but world dependency on its
energy resources makes it a widely contested area among the
world's major powers. With respect to East and Southeast
Asia there is an added Dilemma. That is, all see traffice
must traverse the narrow Indonesian Straits in order to have
access to the region.
For the United States traffic going west
through these straits is of vital importance. Denise Lanot,
^^friting for the Journal of Commerce in April 1980, highlights
Congressional concern of the "possibility of Soviet Union
domination-directly or indirectly- of much or all of the oil
of this CMiddle East] region. """ To counter this possibility
the U.S. must be able to bring its forces to bear on the
region, should the need arise. This does not constitute a
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recommendation for such action, but preparation for such a
contingency is absolutely essential, and may indeed already
be taking place.
An excerpt from a Congressional "extension
of remarks" of Fortney Stark's "The Erosion of a Dictatorship,"
highlights the U.S. dilemma in dealing with Marcos while pre-
paring a force posture capable of responding to the Middle
East.
"The problem is especially critical because it comes
at a time when the two U.S. bases in the Philippines
...are being recast as the logical hub for military
deployment in the Indian Ocean. The role was high-
lighted by two well publicized excursions to the
Indian Ocean by two Subic Based aircraft carriers
..., by Subic serving as the jumping off point and
training center for an 1800 man Marine task force
now headed for the Arabian Sea. The Philippines,
some suspect, is now being groomed for something
bigger, to serve as the Western Pacific springboard
for the 100,000 man Rapid Deployment Force, now
being stitched together by the Pentagon. "2^
If for no other reason than to insure a U.S.
capability to traverse these straits so as to respond to the
Indian Ocean and the Middle East, American influence in South-
east Asia is essential, and the military factor is a crucial
link to this regional influence. However, the straits are
vital in at least one other aspect.
Middle East oil travels through these straits
to form the energy lifeline of many of our East Asian allies,
including the Philippines. The Asian Wall Street Journal
Weekly points out the fears of Asian nations with respect to
closure of the Straits of Hormuz. However, for them the
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problem does not end with the Persian Gulf for having tra-
versed the Straits of Hormuz these tankers must still pass
through either the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, or Ombai-Wetar
Straits. The percentage dependency on Middle East Oil of
i\sian nations, shown below, helps to illustrate these na-
tions ' concern.
percent of total crude imports







Whether or not the United States has a moral
obligation to protect these vital sea lines of communication
for the benefit of its trading partners is immaterial. The
fact remains that this energy life-line is crucial to the
economic prosperity of most of these nations and that blockage
of these straits could easily bring about their collapse.
They must, therefore, insure that these straits remain open.
If the "free world" is unable to guarantee safe passage, this
can only increase the level of influence that can be applied
by whosoever is capable of making such guarantees. As long
as Indonesia remains relatively non-aligned and cooperates
with the U.S., or is at least not hostile, there is no great
danger. However, should a hostile nation gain control of




b. Nature o£ the Threat
The military factor of regional influence is
essential in terms of keeping the Indonesian straits open.
However, in order to understand the military role, one must
understand the nature of the threat and how the military
strength counters it.
The key here involves Vietnam, Thailand, and
the validity of the domino theory. When the United States
pulled out of Vietnam, U.S. Forces merely moved to Thailand.
However, in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine and Thai sus-
picion as to the future American role, the new military
entrenchment came under question. Ultimately the United
States pulled its forces out of Thailand. An interesting
caveat with particular significance, is that the same exact
arguments were used to justify that withdrawal as are now
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bieng used to justify a withdrawal from the R.P."
Saigon fell, and next on the agenda was the
return to Hanoi-Washington normalcy. Prior to its invasion
of Kampuchea, Hanoi intensified its quest for independence
from Soviet dominated sponsorship through attempts at rap-
proachement with the West. Failing this, a Soviet style
National Liberation Movement was put into effect to oust the
PRC and American sponsored Pol-Pot regime in Kampuchea.
Now, in the "Third Indochina War," Turley and
Race believe that the future U.S. course should be to entice
Hanoi since they are susceptible to enticement. However, in

the very same line they suggest that this would not bring
->
5
about an Asian Yogoslavia.^ What, then would it bring about?
Would it lure Hanoi away from Moscow? Would a Peking-Hanoi
rapprochement soon follow? This would have to be preceded
by an accomodation of the Kampuchean issue which could come
about only through Heng Samrin's removal and a return of
Pol-Pot or a better alternative, Sihanouk.
It is hardly likely that any of these out-
comes would emerge. Nonetheless, if such a possibility were
indicated by Hanoi it should certainly be welcomed. What is
more likely to develop is a Vietnamese consolidation of in-
ternal strength and influence in Kampuchea followed quickly
by wholesale Cuban style revolutionary exports. This does
not suggest that Vietnam will soon invade Thailand. But,
as the Vietnamese position in Indochina strengthens (with
Soviet support), a significant increase in the insurgency
movements of the rest of Southeast Asia can be expected.
Peter Navarro, writing for the New York
Times, argues that if Thailand were invaded the United States
should come to the aid with airpower out of Clark Air Base.
His position is based on the premise that the domino theory
is in effect and having engulfed Thailand, Malaysia alone
would stand in the way of Vietnamese control over the
Malacca Strait. His argument may have some merit, parti-
cularly in light of the fact that a Third Indochina War is
not necessarily out of the question. PRC lesson teaching
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expeditions may provide some deterrent but it may be minimal
since all parties recognize that "a second Sino-Vietnamese
27
clash is unlikely to be accompanied by Soviet restraint."
Whether the Vietnamese threat is by way of
direct invasion, an unlikely scenario despite Sino-Soviet
restraint, or by way of increased support of local insur-
gencies, nations must recognize, as did Singapore's Defense
Minister that:
"There is a widely held misconception about the
the nature and appeals of Communism in backward
countries ... Communist appeals and Communist
strength are sometimes believed to be the result
of poverty, oppressive domestic governments, or
frustrated nationalism. This pays the Communist
movement an undeserved compliment .. .The Communist
party in any country has only one purpose- the
revolutionary seizure of state power." 28
If such is the nature of the threat to South-
east Asia-what should the American role be? The U.S. has
repeatedly emphasized that it does not seek involvement in
internal affairs. Admittedly in a military sense this would
be counterproductive. However, what the U.S. does seek from
its military posture is the ability to prevent hostile actors
from exerting undue and unwanted military pressure on the
nations of Southeast Asia. In other words, as Gordon argues,
29
"to prevent one nation hegemonuy."
The combined armed strength of the five ASEAN
nations totals about 693,400 men. Vietnam alone has some
1.029 million. (A complete breakdown of regional military
31
capabilities is provided as Appendix D.) All the ASEAN
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nations, even if they could unite under a military alliance,
could not stop the one million battle hardened Vietnamese
force. Moreover, most of the nations' forces are preoccupied
with indigenous insurgencies.
A possible deterrent, if one exists, is in
American resolve. That is, a demonstration that the U.S. is
determined to maintain its influence in the region. There
are several ways this is accomplished. One is through mili-
tary aid and arms transfers, the other through maintaining
a strategic position in the region.
Since the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea,
military aid and arms sales have increased. In 1973, mili-
tary aid to ASEAN countries totalled US $87.4 million, and
increased to US $161.8 million by 1977. This figure had
declined to US $106.6 million by 1979, but the 1980 estimates
are up to US $147.2 million. In arms sales, ASEAN countries
ordered US $2,482.3 million for the 1978-1980 period. Thai-
land had the largest orders worth US $1,480 million, followed
by the R.P. with US $294.2 million. "^^
However, arms sales alone may not provide
the necessary deterrent. A strategic position by way of
forward opearting bases is an equally vital elem.ent. Whether
this can be accomplished from staging bases in either the
Philippines or Guam will be addressed in a following section
which looks at the U.S. bases in the Philippines and how they
contribute to American regional influence. The key point
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here is to ascertain the need for continued American military
presence in the region as a countervailing strategy to Viet-
namese or Soviet-sponsored Vietnamese aggression.
Such a military presnece signals would be
aggressors, at least on a theoretical level, that the U.S.
does have certain commitments to the nations of Southeast
Asia. The opposite view, tends to indicate a lack of commit-
ment and could easily be misinterpreted as disinterest in
the future outcomes of the Southeast Asia theatre. A U.S.
Army War College study describes this military aspect:
"Withdrawal of U.S. influence and military presence in the
Pacific nurtures the concept and perception that U.S. status
as a world power is in the ealy stages of it demise." "^
3. Political/Ideological
The final ingredient in the regional formula of
influence is the politcal/ideological environment and speci-
fically the climate which will be most conducive to the U.S.
ability to remain a major influential party in that part of
the world.
An earlier point stated that U.S. "interests"
with respect to East and Southeast Asia have been, and should
continue to be, to prevent any single nation from becoming
the sole dominant power in the region. In today's context,
it appears that the U.S. has begun a "love affair" with the
PRC as a check to Soviet influence. This may indeed offer
opportunities to control Soviet expansion but a PRC dominated
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political environment could have negative connotations as
well. Independent nations in Southeast Asia are adamantly
opposed to anyone '
s
meddling into their internal affairs.
They are particularly sensitive to any attempt to impose
foreign ideologies. The course they wish to follow is their
own and there is no reason to suspect that, given the freedom
to choose their own destinies, the political environment
that develops would be hostile to the United States. Thus,
in dealings with China and Southeast Asia, including possibly
Vietnam, the U.S. should seek to preserve a political environ-
ment whereby independent nations are free to choose their
own course.
In "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent His-
torical Perspective," G.D. Loescher argued that "in order to
limit the growing power and influence of the U.S.S.R., Chinese
policy had to be adapted to enable a tactical accomodation
34
to be made with the U.S. A and Japan." However, it should
be noted that this position was adopted within the Maoist
framework contained in "On Policy" which clearly stipulates
that is is sometimes necessary to ally oneself with a sub-
sidiary enemy in order to "limit the relative power and
influence of the main enemy." China may be seeking closer
ties with the U.S., but not to the abandonment of her ideology
Robert Scalapino has provided a very illustrative
article in support of an American policy based on selective
internationalism. He repudiates the thesis that America is
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a Pacific power and not an Asian power because the resultant
strategic withdrawal would create imbalances in negotiations
with the U.S.S.R. and the PRC. The enclave theory is equally
unrealistic because Japan cannot be divorced from Asia.
Thus, he points out that the U.S. is left with a policy of
selective internationalism.
In looking at the Chinese position with respect
to Korea and Taiwan he warns caution in dealing with the
PRC since they have as much hope of becoming the dominant
power in Southeast Asia as the Soviet Union and/or Vietnam.
What he proposes is
:
"An American strategic commitment that is feasible
in Asia should revolve around the effort to get a
balance within Sourtheast Asia, with some conti-
nued American commitments to Indonesia and the
Philippines, a commitment to Japan linked to these
efforts, and an intensified negotiatory process
with both China and the Soviet Union, with the
premium upon reciprocity and accountability . "36
Scalapino's approach would help to preserve the
political order in the region, and this order is at present
dependent on a continued American involvement. A recent
Asian Wall Street Journal "Roundup" of political stability
in Asian countries indicates that with few exceptions most
have been able to claim some degree of internal stability.
They go on to argue that this is likely to remain intact in
the foreseeable future with local power struggles taking
place but no major revolutionary change. This prognosis,
of course, assumes the fact that the U.S, will maintain its
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influence, and the region will remain under some semblance
37
of a balance of power.
Moreover, the recent American election has helped
to reassure Southeast Asian leaders that the American influ-
ence will remain intact. John Edwards' survey for Far East
Economic Review highlights Asian reaction to President
Reagan's election showing the unanimity of favorable response.
They see: a decline in American human rights harassment; con-
tinued arms sales; and aid. They are looking for continued
stability and concomitant economic prosperity further enhancing
their internal situation as well as the regional balance.
The U.S. must be prepared to take advantage of
whatever regional stability exists and wherever possible
exploit opportunity. U.S. interest is not to promote Chinese
influence, rather it is to seek a favorable balance.
Erwin Canham points out that -"Even the present
political floundering inside the United States is viewed
sympathetically, since Asians shiver at the concentrated
39power and purpose of the divided Communist giants." Since
then, Vietnam has helped to highten their fears and the U.S.
has the opportunity to insure its continued influence. As
Richard Armitage points out:
"In an effort to mobilize national will and stiffen
her crumbling morale, Hanoi has engaged in a stri-
dent and extremely dangerous campaign to provoke
fear of a traditional bete-noire, China. This
more than anything else stirs the fears of ASEAN,
for they see no escape from the escalating trend
of global confrontation, Hanoi-style.
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But the threat that Vietnam poses in the region
has spurred a new awakening within ASEAN, which
can and should be encouraged by the United States
...now Hanoi's bungling has presented us with the
perfect opportunity to develop a clear, consistent,
and enlightened policy regarding ASEAN... We must
become at least as aware as the nations o£ ASEAN
in assessing the limitations o£ Hanoi and offer
to those nations a true friendship based on
awareness of their strategic value, their economic
potential, cultural development and right to a
regional autonomy. "40
The U.S. is presented with a situation wherein
the controversy over Hanoi's intentions and the resultant
perplexity of a Sino-Soviet dispute over the region provides
the U.S. the luxury of being the only viable balance of power
status quo nation. Writing for the Pacific Defense Reporter
,
Dr. Mediansky states that "US strategic objectives in the
Indochina conflict are best served by the type of unstable
situation which now prevails." He argues that "An alternative
policy, still based on limited US regional involvement would
be aimed at balancing China's power in Southeast Asia. Such
a policy would be aimed at building a -^Dalance between China
41
and Vietnam while attempting to minimize Soviet influence."
Asia today has a political climate dominated by
fear of the uncertainty over Hanoi's intentions and the
possible emergence of Soviet sponsored Vietnamese hegemony.
While this may embody their primary fears, China as the check
to the U.S.S.R. is welcomed but not to the extent that their
hegemony is any less repulsive. The political spectrum in
Southeast Asia, therefore, can make a significant contribution
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to U.S. global power. A decline in political influence of
the United States in this region could have severe repercus-
sions since it would leave a political power vacuum which
one of the two Communist giants would not hesitate to fill.
4 . Summary
The undef inability of specific national interests
upon which to base foreign policy requires foreign policy to
be based on the ability to influence international actors.
Through global influence a nation is able to control events
such that its interests, whatever these may be, are promoted.
Southeast Asia is an area of the world where the elements of
national influence have a tremendous impact on the U.S.
ability to achieve overall global objectives.
Economically the region is already one of the
most lucrative markets available to the United States and
shows every sign of continuing its forward momentum in the
future. Moreover, it is an area where U.S. relations with
Third World countries can serve as an indicator of the
future prospects of the North-South debate. The United
States has various options available to increase its source
of economic influence in the region. Among these are
liberalizing trade negotiations, and restructuring tax laws
to put the American private sector on an equal basis with
third country nationals.
Militarily the region is equally vital, not as
a means for U.S. intervention in internal affairs, but rather
92

as a signal of the strategic importance the U.S. places on
the region. This strategic importance is well founded. Tur-
bulence in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean littoral
states requires at least some U.S. capability to respond to
that region. Moreover, the energy life-line, so crucial to
several U.S. trading partners, traverses the Southeast Asia
theatre. For at least these two reasons the Indonesian "sea
wall" must remain open to safe passage to and from the Middle
East and the Indian Ocean.
However, while safe passage is fairly well assured
in today's environment, it cannot be guaranteed until such
time that Vietnamese regional goals are clarified. Until
such time the United States must seek to ensure that indivi-
dual nations of Southeast Asia are allowed to seek their own
political destinies. ASEAN's collective capability is no
match for the Vietnamese forces, even if ASEAN were inclined
to become a military alliance. The United States can assist
them through this tenuous period by providing the necessary
military equipment and by maintaining its own military pre-
sence in the region.
The political/ideological spectrum in Southeast
Asia is in the process of transition. Whether these nations
pursue democratic ideals or authoritarian regimes is best
left up to them. The U.S. role in this transition is not to
meddle in their internal affairs, but rather to be able to
identify with whatever political ideology each nation seeks.
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In the case of Vietnam and Kampuchea the same relationship
holds true. It may be too late to provide Kampuchea a choice
as to its political evolution, but failure to negotiate with
the Vietnamese concerning its future intentions after the
"fait accompli" can only lead to further discord. The U.S.
had the opportunity to negotiate with Ho Chi-Minh in 1954,
but chose an alternative which led to the fall of Saigon.
Today a parallel situation may exist with regard to Thailand.
Failure to negotiate may lead to either another
"fait accompli," or another difficult choice as to whether
the U.S. will become involved in a "Third Indochina War."
The political climate can best serve U.S. needs by a main-
tenance of a balance of power in Southeast Asia. This balance
can be promoted by opening up dialogue with any faction, as
long as that faction is willing to recognize individual
nation sovereignty.
U.S. influence in Southeast Asia can be enhanced
or diminished by any one of these varaibles or by all three
interacting simultaneously. Whether the result is positive
or negative, it will have significant implications for U.S.
influence not only in the region but throughout various other
parts of the world. The U.S. must, therefore, attempt to
promote its regional influence, or at least insure that it
is not diminished. To this end U.S. relations with the
individual nations of Southeast Asia should seek to promote
regional influence along the three dimensions to the maximum
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extent possible. There are a host of individual sovereign
nations within the spectrum of influence encompassed in the
above discussion, and U.S. relations with each affects U.S.
regional influence in varying ways.
The Republic of the Philippines is no exception.
Indeed the fact that U.S. military installations already
exist on the islands makes that nation's relationship with
the U.S. a key focal point in U.S. regional influence. There'
fore, as the study progresses toward U.S. foreign policy in
the Philippines the next logical focus is an analysis of how
the U.S. relationship with the Philippines contributes to
regional influence.
B. THE PHILIPPINE ROLE IN U.S. REGIONAL INFLUENCE
At this juncture one distinction must be made perfectly
clear. That is, this discussion is concerned with U.S./
Philippine relations as that relationship projects out into
the regional environment. No attempt is made to suggest, for
example, that because the Philippine economy might offer
little by way of its contribution to U.S. regional influence
that their internal economic future is not important. This
internal rubric will be examined in a forthcoming chapter,
but only after the Philippine contribution to regional
influence has been assessed. The attempt here is only to
analyze the U. S
.
/Philippine relationship to determine whether
or not it contributes to U.S. regional influence, and if so,




The U.S. economic relationship with the Philip-
pines is not negligible but neither is it tremendously signi-
ficant. For the Philippines, U.S. trade is absolutely vital
but this trade represents only a small percentage of total
U.S. World or even regional trade. To the extent that two
way trade with the Philippines contributes to U.S. regional
or world economic strength this aspect warrants only cursory
condition.
As of 1977 U.S. Direct Investment in the Philip-
pines comprised .61 percent of the total U.S. global
investment, 2.7 percent of the total direct U.S. investment
in developing countries, and 14.6 percent of total U.S.
direct investment in Asian developing countries. The 1978
trade with the island Archipelago consisted of US $1009
million in exports to the islands, and US $1206.8 million in
42imports from the same. For the period 1971-1976 Philippine
trade with the U.S. consistently hovered around .8 percent
43
of our total global trade statistics. That year the United
States shipped to the Philippines $1,570 million in exports
compared to a total export figure of $181,798 million, or
.8 percent. Imports accounted for .7 percent. The U.S.
purchased $1,648 million from the Philippines out of a total
. 44
shopping list worth $218,925 million. Moreover, the
composition of the purchases reflects the non-strategic nature
of this trade as a vital resource to the United States.
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Philippine exports are almost totally primary products such
45
as sugar, coconut products, copper, and wood. These commo-
dities can easily be acquired from other sources and as such
do not represent a significant boost to American regional
or global influence.
However, the Philippine economy relies very
heavily on two way trade with the U.S. A large portion of
their exports go to the United States, and a significant
percentage of imports are brought in from the same. For
the period 1971-1976, Philippine exports to the U. S. com-
prised 40.4, 40.4, 35.8, 42.5, 28.9, and 35.9 percent of
their total world exports. Their purchases from the United
States comprised 24.6, 25.4 28.2, 23.3, 21.8, and 22.2 per-
46
cent of their overall import bill.
The U.S ./Philippine economic relationship is
doubly peculiar phenomenon. On the one hand the relationship
contributes only minimally to U.S. regional influence in a
positive sense, since it comprises only a small percentage
of the total U.S. trade or investment picture in the region
or even in the Third World. On the other hand, the
relationship is crucial to Philippine economic prosperity.
IVhile this does not contribute directly to U.S. influence in
the economic sector, it does serve as an indicator to the




In this sense U. S
.
/Philippine economic relations,
although not terribly "vital," are at least a major concern.
However, the internal economic situation is the subject of
a later section. The main point here is to emphasize that
the economic importance is not necessarily by way of direct
profit to the U.S. but rather by way of the implied message
which the relationship sends to other developing nations.
2 . Military
The military contribution of the Philippine bases
to U.S. regional and global power cannot be overemphasized.
First, it is doubtful that the mission could be accomplished
from any other location; and second, if it could the costs
might be prohibitive.
General Graham points out the costs of moving to,
for example, the Marianas. First, it is doubtful that the
land could be obtained. To cite just one example, there is
a 44,000 acre weapons range in the Philippines which could
not be duplicated. This range provides training facilities
for Navy pilots when their ships come in for extensive repair.
Labor problems are also relevant. Skilled labor would have
to be imported from Japan, the Philippines or the United
States and wages would have to be signigifanctly higher.
Construction costs would run over $2 billion dollars to
duplicate the facilities and support costs would come to an
additional $350 million annually since time for fuel delivery
from the Persian Gulf would be increased by 10 days round trip
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The additional ships and aircraft required to maintain the
same level of military capability from the further removed
bases would cost at least $4 billion. Finally, there would
be a 5 year delay in accomplishing the move. This period
would create a serious gap in capability, a gap which other
47
nations might be inclined to take advantage of.
But, even if the facilities could be moved to Guam
or some other location, the added distance would (assuming
distance would increase) have a severe effect on the U.S.
response time to the Indian Ocean. Indeed the mission might
not be able to be accomplished at all. When asked how many
aircraft carriers it would take to accomplish the same mission
as is accomplished by Subic Bay Naval Base, Mr. Holbrooke
advised the Congress that the additional carriers could not
accomplish the task. General Graham supported Holbrooke's
statement, presenting the facts that the American naval pre-
sence in the Persian Gulf during the recent crisis cound not
be supported by any alternative means other than the Phi-
, . . . ^ . , . . 48lippme repair facilities.
He then summarized the global and regional purpose
of the Philippine military installations. This summary clearly
indicates the role that these bases play in contributing to
U.S. regional and global capability.
"1-they are an integral part of our deterrent
system that signals to potential foes our resolve
to meet our commitments. They contribute to the
psychological confidence of our allies."
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2-our bases support, at greatly reduced cost, the
US capabilities in crises and contingencies, not
only throughout the Pacific region but also in
the Indian Ocean and the Middle East up to the
East Coast of Africa.
3-they provide the capability to protect air and
sea lines of communication important to US parti-
cularly regional allies...
4-the bases are a viable manifestation of US power
in an area of obvious interest to the Soviet Union
and China. The capabilities they permit impose
certain defense considerations on potential




/Philippine relations contribute most
significantly to U.S. influence in Southeast Asia by way of
the military installations. However, the political context
within which these base are maintained will have an equally
significant impact on U.S. regional influence. Neighboring
states will watch closely the success or failure of the
Philippine "experiment" in Asian democracy. The evolution
of the Philippine political environment will signal these
nations as to the value of their political/ideological
affiliation with the "free" world and specifically with the
United States.
In its current form, Philippine political dynamism
is best seen as a holding action. For a number of reasons,
many of which are prevalent in neighboring states as well,
Philippine democracy has been postponed. Facing a situation
where crime had run rampant. President Marcos suspended the
writ of habeas corpus in September of 1972, and maintained
a state of martial law until January 17, 1981. As a means of
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restoring peace, order, and respect for the law, martial law
did not necessarily impede the legitimacy of democratic insti-
tutions but its continuation soon gave martial law the appear-
ance of a system designed to perpetuate the dynasty.
Thus, the question of succession will be a key
indicator as to whether democratic instrumentalities will
succeed or fail in the Philippines. Perhaps the Asian form
of democracy is to be by way of the South Korean model. Such
a model in the Philippines would serve as another example,
one much closer to home, of the nature of democratic processes
in Southeast Asian nations.
While democratic institutions were firmly in place
in the Philippines, most were held in abeyance throughout
the period of martial law. Moreover, restoring the writ does
not necessarily guarantee restoration of full democracy.
President Marcos has retained full emergency power including
the right of preventive arrest orders. National elections
and legislative plebiscites are still firmly within his
ability to control, should he decide to determine their
results.
Thus, whether President Marcos chooses to lead his
nation toward a restoration of full democratic processes or
whether he chooses to perpetuate his reign, this choice can
determine the future political course of the Philippines and
connote the utility or irrelevance of democratic forms for
Southeast Asia. Restoration of democratic processes in the
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Philippines can signal success for free world political
ideology. However, the latter course may lead to political
upheaval, continued growth of the oppositionist movements, and
an escalation of popular support for the most radical elements
of the left. This may lead to either mass insurrection or
a South Korean style coup, either of which signal something
less than complete success of American democratic ideology
in Asia.
If the U.S. is prepared to recognize a Philippine
Chon Doo Hwan , then we must be prepared to reconcile American
public opinion to this style of Asian democracy. Having re-
cognized the legitimacy of how President Chon, perhaps this
tells us that such is the only shape that Asian democracy
can take. However, where other alternatives are available
they should be encouraged, for the further the political
forum moves from the ideal democracy in the Philippines, the
further it will be alienated in Southeast Asia. In the long
run, this may say something about the shape of our own evolu-
tion in the democratic context.
In the Philippines, United States strategy has been
nearly impecable with respect to martial law and the political
dimension. While pursuant to his election, Marcos is recog-
nized as the "official" leader (the meaning Philippine free
elections notwithstanding), the American cold shoulder since
the imposition of martial law implies something less than
full support for his tactics. Thus, in its current context.
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the political forum in the Philippines has something of a
neutral effect on U.S. regional influence. Southeast Asian
nations recognize that the United States is involved in a
dichotomous relationship. We must maintain diplomatic re-
lations, and "pay" Marcos for the bases thereby helping him
to stay in power. But, denying full diplomatic niceties,
and conversations with U.S. based opposition leaders, signals
U.S. desires for a restoration of democratic processes.
Therefore, although maintenance of the military
installations is the overriding objective, the United States
must recognize that the transition from Marcos to some other
cadre will have either negative or positive implications for
U.S. political/ideological influence in Southeast Asia.
Maintaining the bases by backing an unpopular, repressive
regime that has lost its mandate risks alienating not only
the Philippine masses but also those elements in neighboring
states and in the Third World that still cling to democratic
ideals despite its somewhat prostituted form.
To the extent that resolution of the succession
question in the Philippines speaks of the relevancy of American
ideology in Southeast Asia this factor impacts significantly
on U.S. regional influence in the political dimension. If
the shape of Southeast Asian democracy is by way of successive
military coups then the United States must be prepared to
reconcile this phenomenon with domestic public opinion.
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However, where there are alternatives available which provide
a better means of maintaining some measure of U.S. political
influence in the region, these should be encouraged.
The forthcoming analysis of the Philippine internal
situation will suggest that alternatives are available and
that indeed these alternatives provide not only the best but
the only means of insuring continued U.S. influence in South-
east Asia. For now it suffices to say that the method the
Philippines selects for handing over the reigns of govern-
ment when Marcos leaves the scene will be at least one of the
factors that will indicate to the nations of Southeast Asia
the success or the futility of American style political
ideology in the region.
C . SUMMARY
This chapter is the first part of the attempt to apply
the influence model to U.S. policy objectives in the Philip-
pines. The model suggests that all interests are dependent
and that therefore, they should be considered instrumental
goals. That is, their value should be measured in terms of
how they help to achieve the next instrumental goal or
"dependent interest." However, due to the nature of the
international system instrumental goals are achieved only
when a nation has the wherewithal to "influence" international
actors
.
Therefore, rather than move directly into an analysis
of U. S. /Philippine relations, the study has attempted first
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to justify the need for continued .\merican influence in South-
east Asia. Having clearly assessed this need the study could
then progress into an analysis of how the Philippines contri-
butes to this regional influence.
Southeast Asia is a key link to U.S. global influence.
Its economic potential is already pervasive and will continue
to grow. Militarily, the region cannot be forsaken for it
encompasses a major gateway to the Indian Ocean and the Middle
East. Moreover, sea lines of energy communication are vital
to free world economic prosperity. The region's political
evolution is vital not only in terms of its military and
economic corollaries, but also in terms of the signal it will
provide to the non-aligned movement of developing nations.
If Southeast Asia is a major link to U.S. global influence,
the Philippines plays an equally vital role in terms of its
contribution to U.S. regional influence. U.S. relations with
the Philippines contribute directly to U.S. regional influ-
ence by way of the military installations, but the economic
and political/ideological dimensions have an impact as well.
Economically, the Philippine contribution to U.S. regional
strength is minimal. This factor has only an "artificial"
impact in the sense that economic prosperity for the Philippines
signals success for economic interaction with the free world
as opposed to non-capitalistic economies. The political
dimension has an equally "artificial" flavor in the sense
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that it signals success or failure of democratic ideology
for Southeast Asia.
Militarily, however, the Philippine contribution is direct
and tangible. They offer the means of projecting a forward
defense strategy, protecting the Indonesian "sea wall," and
signalling American determination to abide at least by the
Nixon Doctrine. Moreover, the costs of carrying out these
mission from alternative cites would be almost prohibitive,
and could be perceived as a lack of such determination.
What has emerged from this discussion is a realization
that U.S. policy objectives with respect to the Philippines
must be couched in terms of maintaining some measure of U.S.
influence in Southeast Asia. The U.S. must seek to maintain
its military installations in the Philippines, but must do
so within the context of a favorable solution to the islands'




"Relationships; Bird's Eye View of Asian Conflict,"
Far East Economic Review (PEER) Asia 1980 Yearbook , p. 16-33
2 Robert Horn, "The Soviet Perspective," from Southeast
Asia Under the New Balance of Power . Sudershan Chawla, Melvm
Gurtov, and Alain-Gerard Marsot, editors; (Praeger Publishers:
New York, 1974) p. 48
"East Asia Study Mission January 5-14, 1980" Report
Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee Congress
of the United States; 90th Congress, 2nd Session, (U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office: Washington, D.C., June 26, 1980) p. 17
"^Ibid. pp. 3-10
^Ibid. p. 2
Op. Cit. "Founding Declaration of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, (ASEAN) August 1967," Press Release
No. 16 of the Permanent Mission of Thailand of the United
Nations August 8, 1967. Document 1 in Southeast Asia Under
the New Balance of Power . p. 119
L. Oakley Johnson, "U.S. Business Looks at ASEAN,"
The Asia Record . November 1980, p. 26
^Ibid.
"Direction of Trade," June 1978, The International
Monetary Fund; Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan data
obtained from Japanese Embassy, Washington D.C.; and U.S.
Department of Commerce;- as cited in Robert Pringle, Indonesia
and the Philippines : American Interest in Island Southeast Asia
(Columbia University Press: New York, 1980) p~! I35
"^Op. Cit. "East Asia Study Mission" p. 3
Direction of Trade Yearbook . (International Monetary
Fund: Washington, • D. C
.
, 1980) pp. 378-379, 222-223
107

"'"^Op. Cit. "East Asia Study Mission" p. 15
1
3
Bernard K. Gordon, "Japan, The United States, and
Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs . 1978, Vol 56(3), p. 587
14Robert Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines :
American Interest in Island Southeast Asia . (Columbia Univer-
sity Press: New York, 1980) p. 145
Op. Cit. "East Asia Study Mission" p. 1
^^Ibid. pp. 6-8
17




Connel, Cowles, and Hoge , "Republic of the Philippines-
A Strategic Study," Army War College . (Carlisle Barracks: Pa.
1977) p. 24
19
Op. Cit. Robert Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines .
p. 68
20
"Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for 1980,"
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives . Ninety Sixth Congress First Session,
(U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1979) p. 5
21Denise Lanot, "Soviet Threat Seen in Mideastern Oil,"
Journal of Commerce . April 30, 1980, p.l
22Walden Bello and Steven Blake, "The Erosion of a
Dictatorship," Southeast Asia Record . as presented in The
Congressional Record by Hon. Fortney H. Stark, March 24, 1980,
E1423
23
"Dire Strait: Asian Nations Fear Blockade Would Halt
Oil Supply from Mideast," The Asia Wall Street Journal Weekly .
September 29, 1980, p. 18
24Joseph Lelyveld, "U.S. in Southeast Asia: The
Military Role Changes but the Stakes Remain Large," The New
York Times. June 23, 1974, pp. l, 24
108

25William Turley and Jeffrey Race, "The Third Indo-
china War," Foreign Policy . Spring 1980, Number 58, p. 116
^^Peter Navarro, "If Thailand Is Periled," The New
York Times . July 9, 1980
^'^Op. Cit. PEER Asia 1980 Yearbook . p. 16
2 8 Remarks of Dr. Goh Keng Swee quoted in Denis Warner,
"First Steps Toward an Asian Common Market," The Reporter
.
18 May 1967 pp. 24-30- as cited in Bernard Gordon, Asian
Regionalism," (below) p. 41
29 Bernard K. Gordon, "Asian Regionalism: Implications
for U.S. East Asian Policy," (Research Analysis Corp.: McLean,
Va. , May 1980, pp. 23-32
30
Ho Kwon Ping and Cheah Cheng Hye, "Five Fingers on
the Trigger," PEER . October 24-30, 1980, p. 34
•^'"The Power Game," PEER Asia 1980 Yearbook . pp. 45,
54-55
32Adlai Armor, "U.S. military aid and arms sales to
ASEAN going up," The Asia Record . November 1980, p. 2
33
Op. Cit. Connel, Cowles , and Hoge, "Republic of the
Philippines-A Strategic Study," p. 25
34 G.S. Loescher, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent
Historical Perspective," Survey . Spring 1979, Vol 24, p. 133
35
Op. Cit. from "On Policy," a Maoist document quote
number 19 of G.D. Loescher's article "The Sino-Vietnamese
Conflict."
Robert A. Scalapino, "U.S. Policy Alternatives in
Asia," Parameters . Vol 5 Iss. no. 2, (1978) p. 22
? T
'''Political Stability Prevails in Most Asian Countries,"




3 8John Edwards, "Now is the Time -But Which Course V/ill
the Skipper Steer?" PEER . November 14-20, 1980, pp. 10-15
39Erwin D. Canham, "In New East Asia-I," The Christian
Science Monito r. March 15, 1976, p. 31
40 Richard Armitage, "Hanoi's Crumbling Policy," The
Christian Science Monitor . August 21, 1980, p. 22
41
Dr. F. Mediansky, "U.S. Policy on the Indo-China
Conflict," Pacific Defense Reporter . August 1979, p. 23
42. Op. Cit. Robert Pringle, Indonesia and the
Philippines . pp. 127-128
"^•^
Ibid . p. 131
44Direction of Trade Yearbook , f International Monetary
Fund: Washington, D.C., 1980) pp. 378-379
45 International Financial Statistics
. (International
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., May 1980) Vol number 5,
p. 323
46 Lawrence B. Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi, Economic
Interaction in the Pacific Basin . (Brookings Institute:
Washington, D.C., 1980) p. 170
47
Op. Cit. "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
for 1980, "*p. 5





V. U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE PHILIPPINES
U.S. ability to influence world events is a vital
element in the ability to achieve national interests. More-
over, U.S. influence in Southeast Asia is vital to global
influence, and the Philippines plays a crucial role in
contributing to UoS. influence in Southeast Asia. Our
military installations on the islands serve as a springboard
to the Indian Ocean; protect vital sea lines of communication;
and signal would be agressors of U.S. resolve in maintaining
a balance of power in Southeast Asia by preserving our own
level of influence in the region. Moreover, the political/
ideological evolution of the Philippines as a republican form
of government will signal neighboring states, and the Third
World in general, as to the prospects of following the "free"
world's political models.
Therefore, because the U.S. must maintain some level of
influence in Southeast Asia, and because our relationship
with the Philippines can significantly promote as well as
diminish our regional influence, the U.S. must establish
policy objectives for this relationship such that it will
avoid the latter and guarantee the former. At this point
the study can focus specifically on the Philippines since
the broader goals of regional influence and the Philippine
role in its external environment have already been delineated.
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Given the validity of the conclusions drawn in the
preceding section, U.S. policy objectives should seek to
preserve our continued use of the military installations
while doing so within a political/ideological climate which
is conducive to peaceful, cooperative negotiation. This is
what the U.S. seeks to acquire from its relationship with
the Philippines. Why the U.S. seeks this outcome was es-
tablished as a corollary of regional influence. This section
will now address how this outcome is achieved within the
Philippine context.
A. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES
The focus here must now shift to the internal environment
to examine the economic, military, and political/ideological
situation prevalent in the Philippines. This analysis will
seek to determine the prospects for the future of the
Philippines along these dimensions and to recommend, from
among the alternatives available to the U.S., those policy
objectives which will best achieve the broader goal.
1 . Economic
The Philippine economy can be analyzed from various
perspectives. The rate of growth of GNP is not particularly
slow, balance of payments deficits tend to vary along with the
trends set throughout the rest of the world, and some progress
is being made in attracting capital investment. However, if
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the U.S. objective is to maintain its military installations
and to promote political stability, then some measure of re-
form in the distribution of income is essential. For a
major percentage of the population the standard of living
is rapidly falling below minimum subsistence. As long as
this trend continues there is little hope of political
tranquility. Therefore, U.S. objectives with respect to the
Philippine economy must seek not only to bring a net profit
to U.S. investors but also to encourage internal reforms which
will improve the living conditions of the Philippine lower
classes
.
A vital element of this review is the trend set by
the Laurel-Langley Agreement. This revision of the U.S.-
Philippine Trade Act (The Bell Act) , "stipulated the manner
in which free trade between the two countries would gradually
end. The Laurel-Langley Agreement raised the Philippine
tariff level and accelerated the pace at which imports from
the United States would be subject to the full Philippine
tariff rate."
Despite the attempts of the Bell Act initially to
establish a period of free trade between the two countries,
the trend toward protectionism began early. By 1965 nominal
protection rates for import competing manufactures averaged
3Q percent, while the effective protection rate averaged 59
percent. The result has been to: 1) provide a larger share
of the market to local producers; 2) decrease overall supply;
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3} reduce consumer income; and 4} reduce exports, character-
istically a labor intensive sector.
Exchange controls have also served to protect
domestic industry. Unfortunately, this protection has the
same result as tariff barriers and import quotas. They lead
to a decline in consumer purchasing power. In 1970 the Export
Incentives Act attempted to improve the situation of the export
industry but to little avail. Decontroling the peso was also
ineffective; "decontrol measures were coupled with tariff
increases, favorable credit terms to certain industries, and
tax exemptions. The discriminatory sales tax and the highly
protectionist tariff system... did much to continue the
sheltering of domestic industry from foreign competition."
Equally significant to the Philippine economy is the
sudden increase in oil prices. Since the Pliilippines is al-
most totally dependent on Middle East oil, the price hike has
added nearly $1 billion a year to their import costs.
Whatever gains the country is able to make in trying to improve
their balance of payments, they are offset by the massive
energy bills. However, it has been their own infrastructure
which, while not actively discouraging energy research, pro-
vided no inducement to exploit leases. While the Philippines
was sitting on 900 million tons of coal and large oil reserves,
the lack of promotion and production capability now forces
them to pay OPEC's prices for their energy.
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Balance of payTnents sunk into the red for the first
three quarters of 1979. Primarily as a result of energy
payments the trade deficit reached $1,257 billion. This
deficit was offset somewhat by non-trade transactions but
the overall account remained in the red by $561 million by
the end of September 1979.
These figures are difficult to interpret into a
specific statement as to the overall position of the
Philippine economy in the long haul. The shifts from
apparent strength to obvious weakness in the balance of pay-
ments do not in th^emselves provide the most valid indicators
of the nation's welfare. Perhaps a better clue as to the
overall welfare of Filipino's is found in the distribution
of income.
Clark Neher illustrates this point in "The Philippines
1979: Cracks in the Fortress." The national income share of
the poorest 40 percent of the people was 11.2 percent in 1979.
The top 20 percent had a national income share of 55.5 percent
And the top 5 percent of the population earned 32 percent of
7the wealth. This uneven distribution of income is even more
catastrophic when we consider what it has done to those lower
groups in terms of malnutrition and unemployment.
"The Asian Development Bank recently reported that the
Philippines was the worst fed nation in Asia, with lower
average daily caloric consumtion rates than Indonesia,
Bangladesh, and India... According to th.e semi-official Food
and Nutrition Research Institute of the Philippines, 40% of
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all deaths (and more than half of all child deaths} are
caused bymalnutrition. The Minister of Health reports
that 85% of all school children now suffer protein and
calory deficiencies ."
8
These factors helped to instigate domestic unrest.
As long as unemployment, poverty and malnutrition persist,
there can be little hope for domestic stability in govern-
ment. Many Filipinos are seeking ways to improve their
situation. With no alternative in sight they begin to turn
to some sort of opposition against the Marcos government
which has been ineffectual in bringing about any improvement
for the poorest segment of the population.
The Filipino is not attracted to communism, but with
little else to turn to, many have joined the ranks of the
New People's Army (NPA) , a Maoist oriented insurgency
9
movement. The recent wave of Manila bombings indicate the
growing opposition to Marcos' martial law government. The
Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao provides further
worry. These various factions continue to gain strength and
test the capabilities of the AFP (Armed Forces of th.e
Philippines). FEER's Asia 1980 Yearbook reports that:
"What concerns the government more is how to stamp out the
Muslim secessionist movement led by the Moro National
Liberation Front C^LF) , and to hold in check th.e expansion
of the NPA in sensitive areas of the country. The MNLF is
estimated to have some 30,000 rebels under arms, while the
NPA has 2,000-3,000 fighters. The military assessment is
that the MNLF has linked up with the NPA, and the abatement




Marcos is attempting to alleviate the economic
difficulties in order to pacify unrest. His "big headache
is the Philippine economy and dealing with the social
upheavals it spawned or exacerbated." He has recently been
trying to follow the South Korean and Taiwanese models by
liberalizing trade with the hope of boosting the export
sector. However, a vital element of his traditional support
is rooted in domestic influentials who have a significant stake
in import substitution industry. Removing protectionist
measures and government subsidies has turned this sector
against him as well. A recent Asian Wall Street Journal
article based on a World Development Bank document describes
"businessmen turned bombers." They claim that: "Recent
terrorist bombings in Manila have been attributed to elements
of the local business sector; the apparent aim is to provoke
enough disruption to force Marcos into holding free
12
elections ."
Marcos is caught in a perplexing dilemma. He faces
opposition from both sides; popular unrest as a corollary of
the plight of the poor, and loss of credibility among former
staunch supporters in the elite. The result is that President
Marcos is severely limited in the measures he can realistically
take to bring economic relief to his country. Although the
methods he is now adopting may in fact be the best approach
toward improving the economy, elite intransigence will prevent
these measures from having the necessary effect soon enough to
restore legitim.acy to the Marcos government.
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Therefore, it would appear that while President
Marcos' approach to solving the economic woes is at least
as good as the opposition's, if indeed they have any plans
at all, he will not be given the necessary time to realize
the benefits. Not only does he face a real threat to his
rule, but his health is in question as well. The United
States should realize these two aspects in the economic
dimension of its relationship with the Philippines. First,
we should encourage the liberalization of trade and offer
whatever assistance is necessary to bolster the export sector
thereby reducing the levels of unemployment. Second, we
should recognize that President Marcos has been ineffectual
for too long a period of time, making it almost impossible
for him to implement the needed changes in time to regain
legitimacy. We should be prepared to identify ourselves
with those elements of the opposition which are not only
truly dedicated to bringing about the necessary economic
reforms, but are also capable of claiming the necessary
legitimacy.
2. Military
The U.S. objective of maintaining its military
installations in the Philippines must consider the domestic
military situation so as to determine the dangers, the
opportunities, and the policies which provide the best means
of achieving our objectives. This study, must therefore,
examine the nature of indigenous insurgencies to determine
the threat to the Philippine government and its impact,
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if any, on U.S. objectives. The role of the American bases
must also he examined not only in terms of the internal
threat but also as a corollary of Philippine security
against external agression.
The Philippines currently faces two separate in-
digenous insurgencies. The first is by way of the New
People's Army (NPA) which is the military arm of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) . The other, con-
centrated in the South, is the Moro National Liberation Front
[MNLF) a separatist Islamic movement in Mindanao.
The NPA hopes to overthrow the government and enjoys
a wider base of support then the Muslim movement in the
South. As the economy continues to decline th,e NPA is
increasingly successful in recruiting manpower. Marcos es-
timates NPA strength at about 2,Q00 guerillas; 5,000 combat
support troops; and 50,000 loosely organized partisans. The
NPA itself claims to have 20,000 regulars; 100, QOO combat
support troops; and a civilian "mass base" of between
13150,000 and 500,000. These estimates are quite misleading
and they vary in two separate ways. First, they vary
according to who is making the estimate. Second, peasant
support naturally varies directly with whoever happens to be
there at the time carrying the biggest gun.
The MNLF's goal is total autonomy. Mindanao's
population is primarily Muslim while 95 percent of the
Philippines is predominantly Catholic. The southern
119

insurgency makes no claims to overthrow the Manila government
but they are tired of the discriminatory effects of their
minority status. They, therefore, fight for a complete
break with Manila. They field about 8,000 armed regulars,
20,000 to 30,000 active supporters, and have a mass base of
sympatheziers as high as 400,000 according to government
r- 14figures.
Neither of these indidigenous guerilla movements pose
any immediate threat to the U.S. ability to maintain its
military installations. The Muslims have no aspirations in
the North and the NPA is not presently strong enough to mass
any kind of sustained military struggle against the AFP which
is over 100,000 strong. The greatest danger, therefore, lies
in the NPA's ability to attract popular support thereby gain-
ing the strength to pose a viable threat to the AFP.
Of the indigenous insurgencies, only the NPA would
have to cast the U.S. out of its military strongholds. They
openly profess anti-American military bases ideology and
should they come to power it would be impossible for them to
negotiate terms with the U.S. that would perpetuate old
agreements. But this danger is minimal and the United States
need not get involved in any military operations within the
Philippines. First, the AFP is more than capable of suppress-
ing the NPA in its current strength; and second, NPA strength
is not likely to grow unless economic decline leaves the
masses no other alternatives.
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Thus, the indigenous threat to the Philippines and
consequently to U.S. objectives is not necessarily military.
The military threat may, in the future, escalate but not
because Filipinos are anti-American. Rather, it may evolve
because social upheaval stemming from economic depravity may
align itself with the PKP just as the remnants of the
Philippine Army joined hands with the Hukbalahaps after the
Japanese victory. In any event the United States should not
become involved with the internal struggle. The primary
objective for the U.S., just as it is for the Philippine
government, is to improve the economic condition thereby
depriving the radical element its popular support.
A recent Defense Marketing Survey "Intelligence
Report" describes the nature of the indigenous threat to the
Philippines.
"Vifhile the major threat to the security of the Philippines
is internal, it is not necessarily from either the Moro
National Liberation Front insurgency in the South or the
more widespread but lower keyed New People's Army campaign
Rather, the government fears local social disorders caused
by an inflation rate that halved the buying power of the
peso in the six years (now eight yearsl of martial law,
chronic poverty--which some observers have cited as the
most serious threat to President Marcos' reign, and the
gradual erosion of Marcos' political support. "15
At a higher level of military analysis the United
States not only faces little danger to its objectives but
actually enjoys a strong position. The AFP is in no way
capable of providing for the security of the Philippines
against external agression. Although there has been some
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rhetoric by President Marcos concerning a self defense
posture for the Philippines the consensus is that the
islands must depend on U,S. protection for national security.
This role is more than adequately fulfilled hy the 5,000
American servicemen at Subic and 10,000 at Clark. These
forces are stationed in the Philippines as a result of
basically three formal agreements dating back to the 1947
Military Bases Agreement, just recently revised; the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1951; and the Mutual Defense Agreement of
1953. These agreements address how each nation will react
to external aggression. While the only guarantee is that
the United States will act in accordance with, its constitu-
tional processes, the military presence provides a clearly
discernible clue as to the importance the U.S. places on its
relationship with the Philippines.
Therefore, as long as these forces are stationed on
the islands, the Philippines can be fairly well assured th.at
no conventional attack will be launched against it. The only
dichotomy would stem from an attack not against the Philippines
per se, but against the U.S. and consequently its bases.
This presents a military problem, but not nearly as much for
the U.S. as for the Philippines. Although there is some
concern that the bases will act as a magnet to draw a Soviet
preemptive strike against the U.S., the Philippines can hardly
afford to expell the U.S. for fear of such a strike. First,
this would leave the islands virtually unprotected against
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conventional attack. Second, without the "rental" fees
paid by the United States, the AFP would be hard pressed to
sustain its military operational capability against the
indigenous threat. Finally, the loss to the economy would
be nearly catastrophic. The bases employ more than 40,000
Filipinos, they pump an estimated $200 million into the
economy, and with the multiplier effect account for nearly
17
5 percent of Philippine GNP.
The U.S. objective of maintaining its military bases
within a congenial political climate is not threatened
militarily, at least not in the short run. The indigenous
insurgency can be militarily pacified and, therefore, poses
little or no threat to the U.S. However, while the "force"
aspect of counterinsurgency can be fairly well implemented,
the "persuasion" aspect warrants careful consideration.
Against the Philippine Insurrection the United States success
came only through tactics designed to remove the basis of
popular support for the insurgents and to develop an atmo-
sphere in which Filipinos became willing to accept American
rule. Ramon Magsaysay again used the "force and persuasion"
formula to defeat the Huks and erode their mass support.
Unlike Thailand or South Korea where the primary
threat is by way of the enemy's military capability, the
main enemy in the Philippines is disassimilation of the masses
as a result of economic depravity and disillusionment with
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governmental functions. Although the most radical elements
of the leftist opposition such as the NPA are not sufficiently
strong right now, they are likely to gain in strength as the
masses approach complete disassimilation with democratic
instrumentalities for social mobilization. While Filipinos
have not yet reached such levels of disaffection the timemay
be rapidly approaching when the transition will be inevitable-
when the masses lose all hope of peaceful democratic solutions
to their problems and turn to violence.
The U.S. military objective is, therefore, not mil-
itary at all. Rather, it involves the persuasion side of a
counter-insurgency effort. It is actually political, for
having reached a point where the primary threat has become
military, disillusionment with democratic institutions will
already be ingrained and military operations cannot prevail.
At such a point U.S. interference of any kind will be
disfunctional
.
Direct military intervention would further alienate
the masses and would, therefore, be totally out of the ques-
tion. But, even more subtle forms of involvement would then
turn against us. The U.S. is now pledged to make the best
possible Presidential effort to secure from Congress $500
million for the Philippines over the next five years. Such
military assistance and FMS credits are today seen as support
for the Marcos government. Should the masses turn to armed
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rebellion, U.S. objectives would be nearly impossible to
achieve regardless of which course we followed. Continued
aid would signal support for the Manila government further
alienating the wave of the future; while withdrawing this
aid would exacerbate relations with the government in power.
Thus, U.S. policy objectives in the Philippines with
respect to the military dimension are actually to prevent the
military dimension from becoming the prime element of social
mobilization. The economic objectives to achieve this goal
have already been delineated. One key factor in that dis-
cussion was that President Marcos had neither the time nor
the wherewithal to act as the political helmsman of this
economic transition. In order to clarify this allegation as
well as to determine the choices available to the U.S. in the
Philippine political/ideological context, the study must now
turn to an examination of this political/ideological rubric.
3 . Political/Ideological
This final and perhaps most crucial dimension is not
readily adaptable to analysis divorced from the consideration
of other intervening variables. Unlike the economic and
military variables which tend to lend themselves somewhat
more readily to separate analysis, the political/ideological
dimension tends to include elements of all human endeavor from
nuclear proliferation to Ping-Pong Diplomacy. It is, there-




In applying the model laid out in Part one.
Chapter Four attempted to justify why the United States
should be concerned with maintaining its influence in
Southeast Asia. Section B of that chapter suggested that
U.S. influence in that region is greatly enhanced by the
military bases in the Philippines. As a corollary, the
economic and political context within which the U.S. main-
tains its presence in the Philippines will affect U.S.
regional influence as well. The net result suggests that
the U.S. overall goal with respect to the Philippines involves
maintaining its military presence while working toward
economic prosperity and political stability for the
Philippines. This chapter attempts to prescribe what the
U.S. should strive for within the Philippines so as to achieve
this overall goal.
The economic and military objectives have thus far
been delineated. In each case the analysis attempted to
focus specifically on the dimension being discussed, but
only to the extent possible. Certainly the economic situation
affects the "persuasion" side of the counter-insurgency effort;
and conversly, the higher the military danger the more dif-
ficult it becomes to improve the economy. In this same sense
the political/ideological dimension reinforces, and is rein- '
forced by, the economic and military variables,
However, in order to facilitate clarification of this
final dimension it will be necessary to accent the objectives
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for the two latter dimensions while recognizing that they d£
have an impact on the political/ideological environment. This
will enable the study to proceed directly towards an examina-
tion of this final variable to: analyze the political/ideologi-
cal environment; indulge in "crystal ball gazing" to predict
the future of this environment; and, suggest U.S. political
objectives which will insure the achievement of the overall
goal described above.
a. The Environment
What is the Filipino mind set? Does the perception
of the Filipino as our "little brown brother" accurately
describe his sensitivities? Robert Shaplen describes what may
be an all to common and perhaps ill conceived notion of the
Filipino as an odd mixture of hedonism and cynicism. He states
th.at:
Tmuch of this attitude of acceptance is due to the passivity
of Filipinos which may be partly the result of their almost
benign Catholicism- they are the only predominantly Catholic
nation in Asia- and their religious beliefs and motivations
are, in this sense, not unlike some of the fatalistic attri-
butes of Islamic faith. "^^
However, having witnessed several Filipino
political debates, this writer finds it difficult to accept
"passivity" as an accurate descriptor of Filipino motivation
or lack thereof. Moreover, Philippine historiography in no
way supports such a view. Where Filipinos have come to
"accept", it has not been passivity but rather pragmatism.
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This writer sees the Filipino as a spirited
soul who loves life and cherishes liberty while recognizing
that some things are not within his immediate ability to
attain. Passivity could hardly account for the Huk Rebellion;
the over one million battle casualties sustained tnrough the
Japanese Interregnum; or the Philippine Revolution (referred
to as the Spanish-American War in .'Vmerican literature) ,
Nor is Filipino assertiveness merely a 20th century
phenomenon. Not only does it date back to Jose Rizal and
the "ilustrados" in the mid to late 19th century, but it
can be traced back to 1521 when Chief Lapu-Lapu and his men
slew Ferdinand Magellan and rejected his fleet back to Spain.
When the Spanish returned, local "barangays" were
overwhelmed by military superiority. The lack of a nation
state organization to offer resistance soon led to Spanish
dominion. While nationalism may not have existed, for there
had not been a "nation" called the Philippines, the Filipino
love for liberty had always been present. Spanish infra-
structure brought "national" identity and "ilustrados" such
as Jose Rizal , Marcelo del Pilar, and Graciano Lopez Jaenacrys-
talized Filipino nationalism and the thirst for independence.
What emerged near the turn of the 19th century
was unfortunate for Philippine nationhoodo Andres Bonifacio
had begun the revolution but was a poor general soon replaced
and killed by Emilio Aguinaldo and his followers. With victory
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within Aguinaldo's reach the Americans intervened usurping
Philippine independence. Aguinaldo's forces soon turned
against the former ally but the Philippine Insurrection
(once again .%ierican terminology, for Filipinos it was
the Philippine-American War} was soon defeated through force
and persuasion. After 57 years of American colonization the
Philippine Commonwealth was instituted in 1935 with indepen-
dence scheduled for July 4, 1946.
Japan entered the scene in December of 1941.
Having capitulated to superior Japanese forces nationalistic
Filipinos took up the fight as guerillas. Up in the hills,
the illegitimate Philippine Communist Party (PKP) established
in 1931 and outlawed by the Philippine Supreme Court in
October of that same year, provided organization under the
National Anti- Japanese United Front (the Hukbo ng Bayan sa
19Hapon commonly called the Hukbalahaps or Huks) . The Huks
then gained a measure of public support and political
significance.
The Japanese were expelled and Philippine
independence came as scheduled. The PKP was again outlawed
and only Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay (later to be
President Magsaysay) was able to defeat the Huk Rebellion
through effective implementation of his "force and persuasion"
program.
This background is in no way indicative of
Philippine susceptibility or acclamation to subjugation.
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It implies only that, from a historical perspective, the
Philippines has consistently faced superior strength.
Philippine resistance to foreign domination or domestic
repression connotes zealous participation in political
ideology. The domestic political forum tends to support
such a view.
From its conception Philippine politics has
been marked by one term presidents, party switching, ballot
stuffing, graft and corruption, Manuel Roxas came to the
Presidency as a Liberal in 1946. He died in 1948 and
Vice-President Elpidio Quirino replaced him to be elected
to his own term in 1948. His Defense Minister, Ramon
Magsaysay, switched parties to defeat Quirino in 1953 as
a Nacionalista. Magsaysay died in 1957 and was replaced
by Carlos Garcia who was then elected in that same year's
Presidential race. The 1957 election resulted in a split
party Executive Branch, Diosdado Macapagal was elected as
the Liberal Vice-President and subsequently won the 1961
Presidential election. Macapagal had promised to step aside
in 1965 allowing Ferdinand Marcos to head the Liberal ticket
When this did not materialize Marcos jumped over to the
Nacionalistas to defeat Macapagal for the Presidency.
These elections were all characterized by the
incumbent opening up the government purse in an attempt to
"buy" re-election, and using the Constabulary to "persuade"
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voters. The challenger could generally win by pointing to
the corrupt practices and repressive institutions of the
incumbent. Again these characteristics do not imply
Filipino indifference to political/ideological structures.
They merely imply that Philippine political dynamism differs
from the "ideal" democratic model, but they are ardently
devoted to it and the system has served them relatively well
until the Marcos coup of 1972.
The Area Handbook for the Philippines
,
prepared
by the Foreign Studies of the American University best de-
scribes the Philippine system of political expression.
"Personal loyalties were translated into tke political
process thorough what Carl H. Lande calls "vertical chains
of dyadic patron-client relationships" extending from the
provincial elite down to lesser figures in the towns and
barrios (smallest administrative divisions, renamed
barangays in 1974) and thence to the voters. It was this
informal system of mutual-aid relationships, not the
formal organization of party committees, that constituted
the real backbone of individualistic partisan politics in
the Philippines. It was through this informal mechanism
that local factions or personal followings articulated their
interests directly to their patrons parading under the
banners of various parties.
The dyadic ties served as a fairly accessible means for
the expression of grass-roots aspirations and needs. As
such they were an indispensable part of the country's
politics. In a society like the Philippines where the
free-for-all, laissez-faire pattern of partisan competition
could easily fractionate the political scene and engender
destabilizing pressures, the dyadic relationships performed
integrative and what might be called safety-valve functions.
By and large this indigenous pattern helped successive
governments maintain an open and stable society th.at was
otherwise marked by great social and economic inequalities.
The dyadic pattern w^as in effect a form of voluntary
contract between patrons and clients. Success or failure
was essentially a personal affair. When patrons failed to
honor their electoral promises for one reason or another,
the voters or their middlemen could always switchtLeir
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allegiance and find new accommodations. Political parties
with which they were associated were not necessarily
blamed, and in any case the voters were fully aware that
they were supporting party politicians as individuals and
not the parties. "20
In 1972 President Marcos ascended to his self-
made throne. Having served two terms, Marcos faced a 1973
election in which he could not be a candidate. Whether
martial law was declared to perpetuate his regime is con-
testable. Crime, banditry and contempt for the law had
become unmanagable and martial law was perhaps justified.
However, martial law was extended well beyond its original
purpose. While it may have been needed at the time, there
was little justification for its institutionalization.
Clark Neher ' s description of Assemblyman Salvador Laurel's
speech before the Cebu-Mandaue Breakfast Club summarizes this
view.
"Salvador Laurel summarized the position of the demo-
cratic opposition noting that the original rationale for
declaring martial law. .. .was no longer pertinent. By the
president's own admission the rebellion had been contained,
therefore, martial law should end immediately .. .peace and
order had returned, the National Assembly met regularly,
and recent elections in Mindanao were held without incident.
Hence, martial law was no longer necessary. Furthermore,
if peace and order had not been restored, then martial law
must be judged a failure and should be ended. "^1
However, martial law alone is not the sole culprit
of the current political dilemma. Authoritarian regimes must
depoliticize the population and reorient it to accept a new
social structure designed to perpetuate authoritarianism. One
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reason for this is that "authoritarian regimes
.. .have found
considerable value in the general conceptual framework sub-
sumed under dependencia theory."" Dependency on "transna-
tional and multinational networks of influence" such as
exists in the Philippines tend to breed authoritarianism
since these networks require guarantees which can only be
made by authoritarian rule.
Robert Stauffer looks at Philippine corporatism
and states that:
"A strong case has been made that the New Society is
more tightly nested in a set of transnational and multi-
national networks of influence-if not outright control-
than at any time since independence, and that these "require"
(functionally) the very types of guarantees that can only
be assured by authoritarianism. "^•^
He then argues that this situation leads to an attempt on
the part of the dictator to reorient the population.
"The connections are obvious: to secure the stability
without which transnational corporation and multilateral
funding support would not be extended, the domestic
population must be depoliticized, demobilized, and, under
certain conditions, remobilized under firm state control.
Institutionally this requires, as Marx noted in his analysis
of Louis Bonaparte's coup against the French Second
Republic, 'the victory... of the executive power over the
legislative power, of force without phrases over the force
of phrases,' Legislatures may linger on, even perform
certain useful symbolic functions, but they remain securely
under the control of the executive, typically dominated by
the technicians of development- the military and the techno-
crats„"24
Stauffer's conclusion are quite illustrative.
They very clearly explicate what President Marcos has attempted
to do since the imposition of marial law.
133

"The leaders of the New Society, after haying destroyed
the political institutions of the precoup regime, have used
authoritarian state power to proceed to construct new
institutions, not only for the political sphere of public
life but for the economic and social as well. In each
sector the new institutions have decidedly corporatist
characteristics: competing groups are forced to merge
under state sponsorship; labor is coerced into "cooperating"
with management and the government in building the economy;
private associations are integrated under a formula of a
single peak body for each profession, economic function, or
social activity; government-sponsored and controlled
"representative" bodies-some with "sectoral" representation-
are created; disciplined "harmony" is decreed as the basis
for building the New Society along with "developmentalism"
;
the military is accorded new honor, respect, and power;
and massive public information programs are directed towards
socializing the population into the values of the new order." 25
Having met with varying degrees of success it
would appear that martial law could now be lifted while the
social institutions it created remain firmly in place. How-
ever, while local barrangays may provide the outward
manifestations of political support, the extent to which
political ideology has been successfully brainwashed to accept
the new political structure is questionable. The 1973
election would have probably seen considerable party switch-
ing, shifting loyalties, vote buying, and accusations of
corruption and repression. Filipinos would have lined up
to do battle with the opposing camp using these same tactics,
but such had been the nature of their "democracy." When
martial law confiscated the tools of political battle it
interrupted the form of political expression but did not
eliminate its ideological foundations.
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Opposition to authoritarian institutions
continued to ferment despite the lifting of martial law.
People recognize that lifting martial law will not
necessarily go all the way toward restoring the pre-coup
forms of political expression. Students immediately
protested what they called the "farcical lifting of martial
26law." In Quezon City, 30Q students turned out to denounce
the political manuever. "Speakers from about ten universities
took turns in condemning the Education Ministry's decision
to revive student councils and governments and described it
27
as a deceptive tactic."^ In Manila, students proceeded to
the American Embassy to protest the lifting of martial law
as a "modified strategy for repression and deception aimed
at institutionalizing U.S. domination in the Philippines
2 8
under the Marcos dictatorship."
Overall reaction was mixed. The United Democratic
Opposition called it a "paper lifting", a "sham," a "joke,"
and "a mad dog with a different collar." Cardinal Sin said
he would wait two months to see if human rights are really
protected. Militant studentry described it as a "fraudulent
manuever." And, the reaction of the Filipino "tao" or man
in the street was divided. An equal number were for lifting
martial law as were against it. However, "only a very small
29
minority were indifferent."
Thus, while the Marcos interregnum temporarily
took away some of the instruments of political opposition in
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the Philippine context, it did not succeed in shifting the
attitudes or ideology of Filipinos toward their political
expression. This is perhaps because the "passivity" Shaplan
speaks of may apply to Filipino attitudes towards religion
or the forces of nature but that it applies to political
ideology cannot be substantiated.
In this context, what is the U.S. political objec-
tive? If the foregoing description of the political environ-
ment is accurate, what can be deduced about the future role
of the U.S. in this environment? It would appear that the
key question lies in what is to follow when Marcos is no
longer in control.
b. Succession
As long as President Marcos remains in power
U.S. overall objectives are fairly secure. The bases will be
allowed to stay, the economy will vacillate between strength
and weakness, and the political/ideological impact will remain
relatively neutral. Just as the Shah was a reasonably safe
guarantee for U.S. overall objectives in Iran, so Marcos
provides the U.S. the needed measure of internal stability.
However, while the overall goal is fairly secure under Marcos,
the United States must be prepared for what follows.
The Shah was overthrown violently. In the ensuing
political chaos the United States fell into disfavor. That
situation provides an excellent point of departure for this
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analysis. Indeed, since the fall of the Shah it has become
fashionable for prominent Philippinists to point to the simi-
larities between Marcos and his former Iranian counterpart.
But, the key issue is not to examine how or
whether the United States can keep Marcos in power. The
question should begin at a more basic level of analysis.
That is, recognition that President Marcos will not remain
in power forever. He will either die in office or will re-
linquish the reigns of government peacefully or through
violent overthrow.
Perhaps Marcos can remain in power until he dies
of natural causes. But, following a policy which is designed
to aid him in this endeavor neglects the impact which the
problem of succession is likely to bring about. The aim
here is, therefore, to predict how this transition might come
about. There are any number of possible scenarios. Most
tend to predict what will happen if Marcos is assasinated or
is suddenly overcome by his illness. The United States must
naturally be concerned with its objectives under each of these
various scenarios but must also determine alternative solutions
Carl Lande, a prominent expert on the Philippines,
has "several visions of the Philippines after Marcos." First,
he sees a bloody struggle for power within the military.
Second, there is the possibility of an inter-regional conflict;
and, finally, a victory by the MNLF , the NPA, or a combination
of the two. These are perhaps valid concerns but one other
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alternative demands attention. Where there are steps the
U.S. can take to promote a peaceful transiton, they should be
explored. Thus, there are four possible scenarios the United
States could address. Three concern Marcos' sudden demise.
The fourth looks at a transition within the context of free
elections and Marcos ' willingness to restore the means of
political expression characterized earlier.
Lande's first scenario sees a violent military
struggle following Marcos' sudden demise. This would probably
come about with Imelda Marcos subsequent claim to power.
Mr. Marcos is an Ilocano and has endowed this group with con-
siderable power through political appointments amd military
promotions. Mrs. Marcos is from theVisayas and does not
enjoy that group's support. Instead, she has developed her
own power base in the military as well as in her own political
cadre as Governor of Metro-Manila. Thus, her succession is
likely to be hotly contested between these two camps.
"Marcos, in view of his uncertain health, may be aiming
to preserve his political innovations by assuring that
his successor would carry on his work. Political analyst
have detected the start of political manoeuvers even within
Marcos' ruling party, essentially between two factions: one
headed by Mrs. Marcos ably backed up by Ver (General Ver)
and most of Marcos' cabinet members; and the other, an as
yet unclear conglomerate of political figures both within
and without Marcos' camp, with Enrile and Major General
Fidel Ramos, Chief of Philippine Constabulary and the
Integrated National Police, considered the prime figures. "^1
The outcome of this type of scenario is difficult
to predict, and would be highly speculative. Nonetheless,
the winning faction will have to rely, as the President now
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relies, on strong support from the military. Thus, the element
that wins control of the military will be the element that
controls the voice of the government.
However, the AFP is highly dependent on U.S. aid,
technology, and arms transfer. It is, therefore, unlikely that
this scenario would result in the ouster of the American mili-
tary installations. The ruling faction would demand some token
concessions for local consumption and a claim to legitimacy,
but substantive changes would hardly be forthcoming. There
would, however, be a deleterious affect on the prestige of
political/ideological affiliation with the United States.
The above scenario describes an intra-military
struggle for power. However, Lande's second vision describes
what could be "even more bloody than an intra-military
struggle, and more destructive of the fragile national unity
which has been built so carefully over the past century."
Such a situation could easily evolve from the military struggle
into a regional conflict with "well armed Ilocanos, led by the
Constabulary" facing the "Tagalogs and Visayans in rebellion.
The outcome of this eventuality is even more diffi-
cult to predict because national sentiment would play a very
large role. Filipinos are not adamantly anti-American, but
anti-MNC and anti-military bases sentiment is often hailed as
the banner for nationalistic fervor. During the ensuing civil
strife of the scenario the undercurrent of anti-American
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sentiment could undergo infectious contagion resulting in
either our total ouster, or less than favorable negotiations.
In this case the United States could hardly afford
to back either faction at the expense of the other. Such a
strategy would totally alienate the opposing camp risking the
possibility of their alignment with the more radical elements
such as the NPA. A massive shift of popular support, and
political legitimacy for this group could tip the scale
leading to another Huk type rebellion. This scenario should,
therefore, be avoided.
A third scenario is that either the NPA, or the
MNLF, or a combination of the two, might overthrow the govern-
ment. During his reign Mr. Marcos has kept a fairly tight
lid on the NPA. Communism is somewhat repulsive to Filipinos
and it is unlikely that the NPA could muster enough support
on its own to pose a realistic threat. Combined with the
MNLF they could cause the government significant difficulty,
but such a coalition is not likely. Carl Lande points out
that "the NPA was attempting to overthrow the government long
before martial law, and note that the MNLF ' s preferred goal
is the dismemberment of the Republic through the secession
of its southernmost provinces."
The military danger of this scenario was discussed
in the previous section. There it was argued that the objec-
tive was not military at all but rather political. As long
as the basis of support for the communist insurgency can be
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prevented, the NPA can continue to be held in check. The
MNLF's goal should have little or no impact on U.S. overall
objectives and indeed secession might bring about improvement
in certain areas. This scenario, therefore, tends to go hand
in hand with the previous.
The immediate danger for the United States lies
in a struggle for power between various regional groups and
the possibility that one of these groups may ally with the
radical left.
A final alternative can be found in a transition
within the established political forum if Marcos restores to
the opposition the means of political combat. There is no
lack of opposition in the Philippines but President Marcos
has such control over domestic politics that should he choose
to continue his reign he can prevent the opposition from
organizing.
However, Filipinos continue to make their best
possible efforts to unseat the dictator. There are any
number of united fronts presently based in the United States.
Some call for violent overthrow but most seek a peaceful tran-
sition by persuading Marcos to hold free elections. Within
the Philippines one such united front is the United Democratic
Opposition (UNIDO) . That group, for example, has already
acknowledged that it will recognize the U. S . -Philippine mili-
tary bases agreement negotiated by the Marcos government."^
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Their unity and their organization is somewhat
suspect but should Marcos choose to allow genuinely free
elections they and others will at least provide the means for
political expression. Marcos may even win such an election
but the method for succession will at least have been restored.
Filipinos may balk at the corruption which prevailed during
the May 1981 elections but they will be gearing up for the
next round, ready once again to shift loyalties, switch parties
and return to the Philippine form of democracy.
This scenario not only guarantees that the United
States will maintain its bases in the Philippines, but it
signals to Southeast Asia and the rest of the Third World that
authoritarian regimes followed by a military coup with its
new oligarch is not the only means for the political evolu-
tion of developing nations.
There are of course many other possible scenarios.
Some are more likely than others, but the area of primary
concern in the political/ideological dimension should remain
succession. The island could perhaps be invaded by the Viet-
namese. A particular scenario here would begin with the dis-
covery of significant oil deposits near the Spratleys. The
ensuing dispute over who has sovereignty could conceivably
escalate. However, the Vietnamese would have little to gain
by carrying the fight to the archipelago not to mention the
difficutly of conducting amphibious warfare.
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Such a scenario is a clear cut for the United
States. U.S. troops would not, and should not, fight over
islands claimed by four different sovereign states. But,
defense of universally recognized Philippine terr^jtory would
have to implicate U.S. forces should they be required.
Still another vision would be that Marcos wins
the upcoming elections and Imelda "buys" the ones that follow.
However, such a scenario parallels the last of the four main
scenarios addressed above. In this case the United States
would have to wait to see if the forms of political expression
were actually restored or if the elections represented a per-
petuation of the institutions created under martial law. Were
that the case the succession issue would in essence have
remained unresolved and we would be facing the same dilemma.
C. U.S. Political Objectives
Of the possible scenarios, the United States
should opt for a return to the Philippine form of democracy,
before Marcos is overcome physically either as a result of
illness or violent overthrow. If the succession issue is
still unresolved at the time of his demise there will be
either an intra-military struggle which may not necessarily
be detrimental to the U.S., but which may excalate to wide-
spread regional conflict. The latter may result in a replay
of the Shah crisis, particularly if the winning faction has
been co-opted by the radical left.
143

Strobe Talbott offers some suggestions as to how
the United States should deal with dictatorships. He suggests
four alternatives.
"First, the U.S. should be especially wary of embracing
dictatorships that have sprung up in countries with demo-
cratic traditions, like Chile and Greece...
Second, the U.S. has more reason to regard a strict, perhaps
unsavory regime in a country as viable if that country faces
an external threat...
Third, it is wiser to support a regime in a country that has
a system for assuring a measure of continuity that in a
nation that does not."^"
All these conditions are prevalent in the Philip-
pines. The final recommendation highlights what the U.S.
position should be.
"Finally, the U.S. should be acutely sensitive to fundamental
and widespread changes in the nature of internal opposition
to right wing rulers, particularly radicalization, growing
resentment of the U.S., and an increased willingness on the
part of the democratic moderates to make common cause with
leftist extremists. Where that happens, as it is happening
now in the Philippines, the U.S. would do well to step up
regular deplomatic communication with the moderates and thus
help strengthen them."3'7
It would appear that the United States is following
exactly the right course. We have continued aid programs so as
not to estrange Marcos; but, at the same time we have aimed
some mildly abusive gestures at this repressive martial law
government so as to disassociate ourselves from its negative
aspects. Tony Hall's clammoring for a reduction in aid as a
signal may not meet Congressional approval but testimony
during the hearings does not go unheard. Moreover, we have
not avidly pursued the recent arrest warrants issued against
U.S. based dissidents, and Richard Holbrooke has gone so far
as to invite Benigno Aguino , the prominent opposition leader
144

at the head of the arrest order, to a luncheon meeting. Mr.
Aguino claims that, during the discussion, Holbrooke told him
the U.S. government would support any peaceful normalization
plan. Marcos realizes that Aguino is beginning to gain some
7
U.S. support, possibly through the State Department.
These policies should be continued since they may
convince Marcos that holding genuinely free elections is
indeed the best of all possible alternative. Speculation is
that President Reagan will adopt a hard line for the U.S.
and that this implies a reaffirmation of support for Marcos
type regimes. This would be unfortunate. The policies that
had previously been followed indicate some measure of success.
There is reason to believe that Marcos is ready to restore
some of the old democratic processes. To encourage authori-
tarianism could easily undo the strength of the opposition
which has struggled so arduosly to restore the forms of
political expression. The United States should, therefore,
continue on its current path; that is, continue paying "rental
fees" for the bases while remaining aloof of the Marcos
dictatorship, at the same type encouraging dialogue between
State Department officials and prominent leaders of the
democratic moderates.
B . SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to clarify some of the basic
issues confronting the United States policy objectives with
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respect to the Republic of the Philippines. Beginning with
the basic premise that the Philippine contribution to U.S.
regional influence is vital, the chapter proceeds into an
analysis of the economic military, and political/ideological
dimensions of the U. S
.
/Philippine relationship hopefully to
determine what course the U.S. should follow.
The U.S. overall objective was highlighted in the pre-
vious chapter wherein it was argued that the overriding con-
cern is to maintain the military installations. As a corollary
the United States should seek to maintain its bases within an
economic and political/ideological climate which speaks
favorably of Philippine affiliation with the United States.
To do this the United States should be concerned, in the
economic spectrum, not only with making a profit for the pri-
vate sector, but even more importantly with promoting economic
prosperity for the lower income strata in the Philippines.
Encouraging the development of viable export oriented
industries will help considerably in this area.
Militarily, there is little cause for immediate concern.
The indigenous insurgencies are well under control by Marcos
and the AFP and it is highly unlikely that any realistic
threat could materialize barring the further alienation and
disassimilation of the masses. Thus, what the U.S. must seek
to prevent is this further disaffection on the part of the
masses. Should the bulk of the population become disallusicned
with the democratic processes for social mobilization- and
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that time is rapidly approaching - they are likely to turn to-
ward the extremism of the radical left. The U.S. objective
in this dimension is somewhat altered from the strictly mili-
tary to a military/political objective. In essence the mili-
tary objective is to prevent the military threat from
materializing through effective application of political/
ideological objectives.
In the political/ideological dimension three braod
categories were discussed. The first consisted of a historical
journey through some of the more salient points of Philippine
politics. First, passivity was denied as being an accurate
descriptor of Philippine sensitivities to politics. Instead,
it was discovered that Filipinos have historically been quite
dedicated and fierce when it comes to this particular dimension.
The Marcos interregnum may have attempted to remove the
institutions of political expression but it has succeeded only
in temporarily removing the tools of dissent from the opposition
Second, several scenarios of the Philippines after Marcos
were discussed. Most concern what is to happen after Marcos'
sudden demise, but one would see genuinely free elections even
within Marcos' reign. This final scenario is the one that the
U.S. should encourage since it offers the best possibility of
assuring U.S. overall objectives. Most other eventualities
could lead to the U.S. falling into the same disfavor it




The United States, fortunately, has followed excellent
policy guidelines with respect to the Philippines. Negotia-
tions with the Marcos government over the military installa-
tions have been pragmatic. He provides the bases we provide
the money. On the other hand, diplomatic niceties have been
withheld while American diplomats indulge in conversation
with some of Marcos' most staunch opponents. This signals
U.S. desires to disassociate itself from the distasteful
characterization of being the supporter of the Marcos dic-
tatorship. These policies should be continued since they have
had some measure of success and it appears that Marcos may be
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This study has gone to some length to discover the U.S.
national interest in the Republic of the Philippines. In
essence, this has been a two part endeavor. First, the thesis
has attempted to verify that there is no such concept as a
national interest in or tuward another thing or entity. It
has said that to base foreign policy on something the United
States would like to achieve neglects the fact that in a plu-
ralistic society it may be impossible to identify one single
all inclusive definition of what the American national
interest is.
For these reasons, the national interest concept should
be viewed as a topological space which consists of all the
values, needs and cognitive structures inherent to American
society. How these things are ultimately translated into
foreign policy requires recognition that interests are always
dependent on other interests. There is no ultimate independent
interest or ultimate goal which stands alone and is accepted
by each and every individual as a self-evident truth. Rather,
each interest is actually an instrumental goal and its value
should be measured in terms of its effectiveness in achieving
the next higher goal in an endless chain of dependent interests
What emerges from the first chapter is a realization that
the only common denominator in the concept of the national
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interest is the ability to achieve whatever that interest
topology is eventually defined to be. No matter how that
space of interests is defined influence will be required to
achieve those interests. This is particularly true in the '
international system where there is no organization which is
capable of guaranteeing that each state will have the right
to pursue its interests as it sees fit. Instead, nations
are responsible for promoting, and protecting their own
interests by influencing world actors to behave in a way that
will be compatible with the interests of others.
The second chapter, therefore, dealt with the nature of
influence. The discussion at the conceptual level stipulated
that power is not necessarily meaningful as the ultimate
means of persuasion. While power- military, economic and
political- is an important aspect, the thing that will deter-
mine which way a nation behaves is the summation of rewards
and costs. This was referred to as the influence relationship
and a nation can gain such influence through economic, military,
and political ideological strength in the world environment.
The study then progressed to a discussion of how these
three dimensions affect U.S. influence in the global context,
particularly emphasizing U.S. relations with Third World Nations.
Economically, the United States has much to gain by seeking
improved economic interaction with the Third World. Militarily,
the nature of the Soviet threat requires that the United States
be prepared to check Soviet expansionist incursions into
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various regions of the world and, once again, particularly
in the Third World. The final dimension is equally vital.
Where the U.S. adheres strictly to some ideological or mora-
listic commitment to foreign policy without adequately weighing
the impact which such policies will have on U.S. global
influence the result may be to our own peril.
Thus, what emerges from Part One is the realization that
U.S. foreign policy should not really be "based" on the con-
cept of the national interest, but rather on the concept of
the American ability to achieve these interests whatever they
may be. This ability requires influence in the international
system- the ability to control the influence relationship such
that actors will behave in the desired fashion.
Part Two then attempts to apply that model to the U.S.
relationship with the Philippines. It is at once observed
that if influence is to be the primary goal of U.S. foreign
policy, the need for U.S. influence in the Philippines must
be verified. To this end Chapter Four attempted to delineate
the need for U.S. influence in the Southeast Asia region
and then examine how the Philipines contributes to or detracts
from this influence.
In Southeast Asia U.S. influence is vital because its
impact on U.S. global influence is tantamount. Economically
the region is maintaining a respectable rate of growth whereas
growth in developed market economies has waned. Moreover, its
potential as a future market for U.S. exports and as a possible
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source of raw materials, to include perhaps energy resources,
is significant. Already two way trade equals that of U.S.
trade with West European nations, and exports hold a close
second at 20.0 percent versus 27.0 percent of total U.S.
export markets in West Europe.
Militarily, the Indonesian "seawall" must remain a vital
concern. U.S. military strength in Southeast Asia must be
maintained. Not only is military traffic going West through
these straits crucial as a means to project American military
power in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, but oil traveling
East to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and many other American
trading partners must also have access to Indonesian waters.
Whether the United States has a moral, or philosophical
commitment to protect East Asia's energy lifeline is not the
issue. The fact is that whoever is capable of making the
necessary guarantees with respect to these straits will in
fact be the predominant party of any influence relationship.
Southeast Asian nations cannot protect themselves against
Vietnamese, especially Soviet sponsored Vietnamese, hegemonis-
tic aspirations. Vietnam has 1.029 million men under arms,
well trained and battle hardened. ASEAN states have chosen
not to pursue a military alliance, and rightfully so. Even
their combined strength would be outnumbered, and each nation
is totally engrossed in pacifying indigenous insurgencies.
Fighting external agression could be a hopeless endeavor.
Therefore, continued U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia
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is crucial, if only as a signal that the United States intends
to abide by its commitments even if these commitmens are only
to the extent of the Nixon Doctrine.
Politically, Southeast Asia is in a period of transition.
Having experienced centuries of colonization at the hands of
Spain, France, England, the Dutch, and the Americans these
nations are now in a process of shaping their own political/
ideological destinities. The U.S. role in this evolution
will signal the extent to which the "free" world's political
models can succeed in Southeast Asia.
United States relations with the Philippines make a sig-
nificant contribution to American regional influence in
Southeast Asia. The cost of moving the military presence to
Guam or to some other location are prohibitive and the mission
to the Indian Ocean would be impossible to accomplish from a
further removed cite. Moreover, strategic withdrawal would
have the effect of signalling that U.S. military commitment
and strength in Southeast Asia is in the early stages of its
demise.
Economically and politically, the Philippine future will
also effect U.S. regional influence. Should the Philippines
undergo economic collapse and/or political chaos, neighboring
nations cannot help but interpret this as the futility that
comes about from close affiliation with the West but more
specifically in the Philippine case with the United States.
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Therefore, the model would indicate several things. First,
U.S. influence in Southeast Asia is crucial. Second, the Philip-
pines contributes significantly to U.S. regional influence. As
the model then attempts to focus specifically on the American re-
lationship with the island archipelago, the emphasis must shift.
If the U.S. is to maintain its bases in the Philippines
and this is to be done within an economic and political context
which contributes to Philippine prosDerity, how the U.S. can
accomplish this broad goal is the next topic of inquiry. Chapter
Five, therefore, attempts to analyze each dimension with the hope
of clarifying what the U.S. objective should be for each.
Economically, the Philippines is in a turbulent era. GNP
growth rates, balance of payments, and terms of trade tend to
fluctuate from apparent strength to obvious weakness, but
these trends parallel global trends of inflationary pressure
and overall recession. The real calamity can be found in the
distribution of income. President Marcos, and indeed the
entire economic infra-structure since independence, has
emphasized import substitution industry. Unfortunately this
is at the expense of the labor intensive export sector. As
a result, commodity prices tend to remain artificially high
wh,ile the purchasing power of the lower income strata declines.
Umemployment and underemployment is a way of life resulting
in a population that has the lowest calory consumption rate
in all of Asia.
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Economic depravity breeds social unrest. The political/
ideological dimension is analyzed in the last section of the
fifth chapter but it has particular significance for U.S.
objectives in the economic sector as well. If political/
ideological stability is to be one of several U.S. goals for
the Philippines, economic prosperity is a necessary prere-
quisite. The objective, therefore, is to ensure that while
the American private sector is out there making a profit, the
U.S. as a whole encourages and contributes to the economic
prosperity of the loiver income strata. This can be achieved
by providing assistance wherever possible to boost the export
sector of the Philippine economy. President Marcos is pre-
sently attempting to accomplish this task but the extent to
which he can provide this guidance is questionable.
The military dimension is somewhat nebulous. The two
primary indigenous threats to the Philippine government do
not necessarily represent the immediate danger. Indeed, there
should be little or no immediate danger provided the population
does not become totally disaffected with government. More-
over, Philippine dependency on American protection against
external agression and the impact of the American bases on
Philippine GNP serve to insure that the Philippines will
continue to rely heavily on the U.S. The primary concern,
therefore, in the military dimension is to prevent the Filipino
masses from becoming totally disassimiliated from the
institutions of democratic government and turning to the
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radical leftist extremists as the only viable outlet for
political expression. The economic contribution to this
objective has been summarized, what remains is the political/
ideological dimension which tends to tie all these factors
together.
The Filipino is by no means passive when it comes to
politics. For four hundred years Filipinos have been resist-
ing foreign domination and domestic repression. Philippine
political expression is characterized by shifting loyalties,
party switching, and dissent against whichever faction contri-
butes least to one's own agrandizement . However, this system
has served the Philippines well and they strongly desire a
return at least to the atmosphere which allows them their
form of political/ideological expression.
President Marcos' interregnum through the vehicle of
martial law removed the Philippine institutions of political
dissent but it did not quell Philippine ideology. Opposition
is strong and they are increasingly demanding the right to
attempt to unseat the current dictator. As a result the key
issue of U.S. concern is succession. Whether Marcos remains
in power until his natural or quixotic demise what follows
in his wake will have certain repercussions for the United
States. The U.S. objective is, therefore, to accurately
forecast how and when this transition might come about and





Carl Lande has three visions of what will follow Marcos.
An intra-military struggle may not necessarily impede U.S.
efforts but should such a struggle escalate to regional con-
flict the outcomes could be catastrophic. Both of these
scenarios should, therefore, be avoided. The third vision,
as unlikely as it may be, has tremendously negative implica-
tions for the United States. Should the NPA, the MNLF, or
their combined effort succeed against the Marcos government
a Shah of Iran debacle could easily follow.
What Lande did not address, however, is the possibility
that President Marcos might restore to the opposition the
ability to organize. This scenario is perhaps the best of
all possible alternatives because the democratic opposition
is likely to remain as commited to the U.S. as Marcos and
his predesesors have been.
The United States is following a precise and accurate
course in this endeavor. It must be continued. Negotiations
for base rights resulted not in commitment to specified amounts
but rather in a pledge to "attempt" to secure these amounts
given Congressional approval. Committee debates over dollar
cutbacks help signal to Marcos and all Filipinos that the
U.S. wants the bases but prefers to disavow support for
autarchy. Moreover, remaining aloof to the "President"
while cozying up to his opposition has had some impact on
Marcos' strategy. Martial law has been lifted but more
importantly Marcos has made some overtures toward a May
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election. What remains to be seen is v\fhether there will be
elections Philippine style or Marcos style.
In the final analysis the main thrust of this paper has
been a recoomendation as to how the U.S. should approach its
relationship with the Philippines. What has emerged is a
realization that U.S. foreign policy in other nations of the
world should not necessarily be based on a strict, consensus
opinion of what the national interest is or is not. The fact
that the concept is at least difficult to define, if not impos-
sible indicates that the vehicle to be used in the transition
from American dreams and aspirations to American foreign
policy is influence.
Thus, as one looks at his nation's relationship with
another sovereign state, he need querry how that relationship
can be made to contribute to the American ability to achieve
its dreams and hopes rather than to become overinvolved with
determining what these aspirations actually are. Such a view
paints a totally different picture of what U.S. foreign
policy in the Philippines should be. While there are those
who would contend that the U.S. has no_ national interest in
the Philippines per se, there is little doubt that this nation
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of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
August 1967
Press Release So. 16 of the Permanent Mission of Thailand to
the United Nations, August 8, 1967
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Indonesia, rhe Deputy Prime .Winister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Phiiippmes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:
Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems
among the countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to
strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation:
Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote
regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership
and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region:
Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished
ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best
attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful
cooperation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties
of history and culture:
Considering that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary re-
sponsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region
and insuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they
are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference
in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in
accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples:
Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the
expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be
used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of
states in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national develop-
ment:
Do hereby declare:
First, the establishment of an association for regional cooperation among
the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural develop-
ment in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of cquaiirv and
partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and
peaceful community of South-East Asian nations:
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2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the
region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and
administrative fields:
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research
facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative
spheres:
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agri-
culture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of
the problems of international commodirv' trade, the improvement of their
transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living
standards of their peoples:
6. To promote South-East Asian studies:
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international
and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all
avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.
Third, that, to cany out these aims and purposes, the following machinery
shall be established:
A. Annual meeting of foreign ministers may be convened as required
B. A standing committee, under the chairmanship of the foreign minister of
the host country or his representative and having as its members the
accredited ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the
work of the Association in between meetings of foreign ministers
C. Ad hoc committees and permanent committees of specialists and officials
on specific subjects
D. A national secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of
the Association on behalf of that country and to service the annual or
special meetings of foreign ministers, the standing committee and such
other committees as may hereafter be established
Fourth, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the
South-East Asian region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and
purposes;
Fifth, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of
South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and,
through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity
the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.
Done in Bangkok on August 8, 1967
For Indonesia: (Signed) Adam Malik
Presidium Minister of Political Affairs,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
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For Malaysia: (Signed) Tun Abdul Razak
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister ot" Defence
and Minister of National Development
For the Philippines: (Signed) Narciso Ramos
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
For Singapore: (Signed) S. Rajaratnam
Minister for Foreign Affairs
For Thailand; (Signed) Thanat Khoman
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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